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BETWEEN MIGRATIONS TO EUROPE AND RETURNS

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Table of Contents

For an Introduction - Senegalese Street Vendors and the Migration and Development Nexus

by Michele Gonnelli, p. 8

The Senegalese Transnational Diaspora and its role back Home

by Sebastiano Ceschi & Petra Mezzetti, p. 13

Imagining Europe: being willing to go does not necessarily result in taking the necessary Steps

by Papa Demba Fall, p. 21

EU Migration Policies and the Criminalisation of the Senegalese Irregular Migration flows

by Lanre Olusegun Ikuteyijo, p. 29

Reframing Senegalese Youth and Clandestine Migration to a utopian Europe

by Jayne O. Ifekwunigwe, p. 35

Senegalese Values and other cultural Push Pull Factors behind migration and return

by Ndioro Ndiaye, p. 41

Returns and Reintegrations in the Senegalese Labour Market

by Pape Sakho, p. 47

The Policy Fallacy of promoting Return migration among Senegalese Transnationals

by Alpha Diedhiou, p. 53

The PAISD: an adaptive learning process to the Migration & Development nexus

by Francesca Datola, p. 59

The local-to-local dimension of the Migration & Development nexus

by Amadou Lamine Cissé and
Jo-Lind Roberts, p. 67

Fondazioni4Africa promotes co- development by partnering Migrant Associations

by Marzia Sica & Ilaria Caramia, p. 73

Switching Perspectives: South- South Migration and Human Development in Senegal

by Jette Christiansen & Livia Manente, p. 79

About the ITPCM

Next Trainings in Agenda, p. 88

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The ITPCM International
Commentary

FOR AN INTRODUCTION

Senegalese Street Vendors and the Migration & Development Nexus

“One euro, one euro please, to buy a sandwich, I did not sell anything today”. You bump into them every day, just by walking to and from your office. They walk all day long, 7 days a week or nearly, for months, sometimes years. You see them snaking into all possible streets, every little corner downtown, wherever pedestrians have access. They look for fortunate encounters, someone willing to delve a hand into the pocket and flip a coin, or pretending to be in need of the nth lighter, a new packet of napkins or some extra soaks. Their quest is about little monetary rewards, demonstrating their perseverance and resilience.

They are what I would call the ‘walking’ portion of the Senegalese migrants in Pisa. Back in the 90s they were just a bunch of guys, more scared of you than you were surprised to see them. Today they are dozens, cheering up a student town to which they keep arriving and returning, with their rucksacks, their bags, or the typical cardboard box lying on their forearm, a compendium of an entire Chinese knick-knack shop.

But not all of them are ‘walkers’, there are other profiles and field of specialization. ‘Parking assistants’, on the most trafficked squares and streets, ‘fashion sellers’ on the town mall, next to branded shop windows. ‘Glamour sellers’, close to the Leaning Tower, where they can better intercept international tourists flows willing to buy counterfeit glasses and watches. Showing a higher level of education and a different dress code, ‘cultural promoters’ instead sell traditional books in front of well-established bookshops. When it rains, however, like magicians they all turn into ‘shelter providers’, somehow able in

only a few minutes to sell the same sort of umbrellas to all unequipped commuters in town.

If being a street vendor is the common trait for all of them, then basically time - their time - is the good that is on sale. Casual human and residual spatial resources in town are rationally exploited, looked after and serviced, in order to maximize returns on their investment, which is their waiting, their prolonged presence. To increase their probability of success they all adopt a same strategy. They tend to expand as much as possible their exposure to a fortuitous possibility of gain. That is their being there at the right moment with the right person doing the right thing.

Time, inexorably, is the main resource around which this male gendered form of migration revolves. The money they can put together serves three main objectives: it pays for their food and accommodation, often in overcrowded apartments where diet, meals and expenses are communitarianly managed; it pays for periodic travel costs to and from Senegal; and, it pays for part of the household needs of their extended family back home. They send remittances on a regular basis to relatives, spouses and children, in their place of origin. If they are lucky, some report sending up to 200-300 euros a month. They never tell you when they are about to leave, but you realize that they have been away, sometimes for months, as soon as they are back. Suddenly you recognize that they have become a part of your environment, of your people. You have grown up crossing their gaze and their urban trajectories. You have become familiar with their faces, accustomed

to the way they shake your hand or greet you. They tend to maintain good relationships with their selected local *clients*, year after year, and through this building up a sort of customary loyalty.

All these dynamics escape, totally or in part, the analysis and outputs of this issue of the commentary. They represent more recent trends, but also an often submerged and under investigated dimension of the (irregular) migration flows that link Senegal to Europe. By the same token these men are often overlooked or bypassed by more institutionalised forms of intervention, at the policy making and implementation level. Less educated and undocumented, though they are potential targets and beneficiaries of said policies, they repeatedly fail to qualify for a regimented policy pattern (too big-scale projects/actors?), invariably adopted by governmental and non-governmental development actors alike.

But be it how it may, these dynamics represent, more generally, another side of the coin, a switch on those same issues that are more overtly debated in these pages. Yet, the daily witnessing of these men, while far from being scientifically grounded, confirms most of the trends and findings presented within this publication. For example, the circularity of the migration movements and the subsequent shaping of transnational lives, routes, and identities or the temporary nature of recent returns and the role of endurance and self-reliance as cultural drivers in the migratory self-validation process.

Articles are presented in an order that suggests a way to approach the complexities that are at stake and provide

for a reading path. In their opening contribution, Ceschi and Mezzetti frame and detail the main characteristics of the Senegalese out of Senegal. Amounting to 2/3 million, according to some estimations, the Senegalese living abroad qualify, with regards to their traits, as a transnational Diaspora. Within this framework, and given the spontaneous solidarity they usually show towards their homeland, both authors look into the role the European Senegalese Diaspora plays, politically and economically, back in the country of origin.

From an indigenous perspective, Demba Fall sheds new light on the Senegalese migratory process while providing a detailed account of the main findings of the EUMAGINE project, *Imagining Europe from the Outside* (concluded in 2013). If a very strong desire to leave the country (up to 82% of the surveyed population in some cases) is very popular, acquired data show a far less uncontroversial readiness to implement the will to migrate. While the migratory aspirations vary according to the relative perception that people have of Europe or Senegal, he posits how such aspirations can have a great impact on people's everyday life and (negatively) affect the management of households' revenues.

Ikuteyijo, after having recalled the main historical patterns and trends of Senegalese migration, focuses on how routes and flows have been impacted by the EU migration policies. He argues that migration management across the EU - being characterised by punitive measures aimed at deterring irregular migrants and treating them as criminals - resulted in an enlargement of *real* criminal networks. In more recent years, in the face of rising human rights advocacy, the EU and other destination countries have embraced more participatory migration management tools, whose main priorities remain, however, to thwart irregular migration and help irregular migrants to reintegrate back into their countries of origin.

Ifekwunigwe, within this framework, argues that most policy interventions on migrations from continental Africa to Europe favour a "one size fits all" approach that rarely acknowledges their nature as racialised forms of urban

youth protests. Dissatisfaction with neo-colonial conditions at home would lead African migrants, who are socially designated as black, *to risk their life and limb en route*, as she puts it. Reframing such movements within the historical context of the Global African Diaspora, she maintains, helps to highlight migrants' pursuit of an imagined European paradise.

Also supporting the idea that migration determinants are not merely economic, the contribution by Ndioro Ndiaye focuses on other cultural aspects of the Senegalese background. Relationships between spouses and their children, religious and gender issues, as well as socially praised values shape the main drivers of the future would-be migrant. But cultural aspects also deeply affect return processes in terms of *push-pull* factors. While looking in particular at lower income class dynamics, she maintains that culture can work as a blocking factor to social insertion, both in the country of origin and in the country of destination.

The problematic nature of Senegalese returns is the focus of Sakho's contribution. Building upon the MAFE project's main findings (2012), he draws from statistics that span over a long period of time, starting from the mid 1970s. If proportions of returns have been declining since then, from 54% to 20% (in the first decade of the 2000 years) the data shows, at the same time, a prevalent global tendency to make short stays in their home country. When it comes to reintegration in the local labour market, ex-migrants compared to non-migrants, have a higher presence in those professional sectors requiring higher qualifications and they suffer less from unemployment and inactivity.

Diedhiou, in his write-up, confirms this analysis while addressing the main flaws of the European migration policies promoting returns. Elaborating on three orders of return, among Senegalese migrants, as he sees them - transitions, permanent return, and circulation, he maintains that such policies move from untested assumptions and disharmonic timeframe perspectives, covertly reflecting a different and more compelling political agenda. By associating immigration with growing in-

ternational insecurity, current policy narratives in Europe turn such issues into *the need to avert potential national security crises*, as he puts it.

In the realm of the above mentioned return policies, the contribution by Datoła provides for a detailed account of the on-going PAISD project. A joint initiative between France and Senegal, the PAISD project addresses the Migration and Development nexus from a promising perspective that adopts a more 'private-sector-oriented' approach. Entrepreneurship and private collective investments are meant to couple the social dimension and other capacity building activities of the programme of co-development.

Along similar lines, Roberts and Cissé elaborate on the Joint Migration and Development Initiative in Senegal, currently in its second phase of implementation (2013-2015). Drawing from the evidence generated by the project, they argue that the effectiveness of M&D activities largely depend on strategic partnerships between Diaspora organisations and local governments at the decentralised level. *PAICODEL* and *Jappando* programmes, implemented in Sedhiou and Diourbel respectively, provide for sustainable examples in this respect.

By the same token, Sica and Caramia report about Fondazioni4Africa (F4A) Senegal Initiative (2008 - 2013). Promoted by four Italian foundations of banking origin, the programme was meant to capitalize and endorse the role that Senegalese migrant associations can have in fostering development. While involving, on claimed equal terms, 9 Diaspora associations based in Italy, it promoted saving and remittances through microfinance, stronger links with the community of origin as well as awareness raising and development education activities. To this end training and capacity building for the partnered association were the preliminary steps undertaken prior to project implementation.

Finally, Christiansen and Manente close this issue by switching perspectives. They look at South-South migration flows, to and from Senegal, providing for an account of their overall rel-

evance, at the regional and global level. On the one hand their contribution is a reminder of the relativity of the European perception on the whole migratory issue. On the other hand, if a common migratory culture helps to frame these movements within western Africa, it is their impact in terms of human development and in the local context in Senegal (Casamance) that end up being particularly praised. Beyond (or despite) western driven developmental initiatives, these experiences seem to postulate for the role played by the regional spontaneous transmission of the so-called *social remittances*.

International mobility and freedom of movement *per se* are values on the rise, and in the face of globalization, they reach out in unprecedented numbers to more and more people in the world. Cultural exchange and the cross-fertilization of experiences and backgrounds have also their positive outcomes, besides an inevitable cultural hybridization that is part of life and brand of *movement* itself. The biggest challenge lies in making this process as bio-culturally diverse and as representative as possible. Far from that, western policy agendas tackling migration issues often still reflect security issues, identity concerns or a racialised bias. Maybe it is just a matter of time, such as it is for the 'walkers' mentioned in the beginning. How many roads must a street vendor walk down before he can go back home? *Only* he knows.

Michele Gonnelli

*All your beautiful words
All your beautiful promises
We still wait for them
You promised me I would have a job
You promised me that I would never go hungry
You promised me that I would have real work and a future
Actually, so far I still see nothing
That's why I decided to flee,
that's why I'm clearing out in this canoe
I swear! I cannot stay here one more second
Better to die than live in such conditions, in this hell
Come what may
I prefer to die*

By Awadi and Kirikou 2006
a popular 2006 rallying cry
and lament by Senegalese rapper
and record producer DJ Awadi

Contributions

pp. 12 - 85



Dakar Rooftops

Senegal 7 January 2011 | Jeff Attaway

THE SENEGALESE TRANSNATIONAL DIASPORA AND ITS ROLE BACK HOME

THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SENEGALESE STATE AND ITS CITIZENS ABROAD REPRESENTS A CENTRAL ARENA FOR DETERMINING FUTURE PATHS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE COUNTRY. THE VAST SENEGALESE DIASPORA HAS A WEIGHT IN DETERMINING ELECTORAL RESULTS AND IN SPURRING DEVELOPMENT. IN THIS FRAMEWORK, THE RE-DYNAMISATION OF CONSEIL SUPÉRIEUR DES SÉNÉGALAIS DE L'EXTÉRIEUR AND PLANS FOR EXTENDED SOCIAL PROTECTION ARE AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE CURRENT DEBATE.

by Sebastiano Ceschi & Petra Mezzetti

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The Senegalese Migration

Migrations have played, since the pre-colonial period, an important role in the West African social space, characterized by great dynamism in human mobility and shaped by a number of migratory waves of populations (Fage 1969; Amin 1974; Amselle 1985). Senegal, which from early colonial times has been a destination country for

Lebanese and French emigrants, became an important migratory pole after Independence in 1960. For at least three decades, the country experienced both emigration and immigration flows, mostly within the African continent, receiving foreign population mainly coming from Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania and Mali

and re-exporting migrants in these countries as well as in Ivory Coast and Gabon, leading destinations the recent past, which are losing ground today (Fall, Carretero, Sarr 2010). In this sense, Senegal is fully included in the West African migratory system of which it represents one of the main poles, after Nigeria and Ivory Coast,

appearing at the same time really integrated in the world migratory system.

Until the 1990s, migration outside Africa remained generally limited to specific areas of departure (above the River Region, in the Northern part of the country) and destination (France), as well as to specific ethnic groups (mainly Soninké et Haal Pulaar) (Quiminal 1991; Timera 1996). However from the mid-1980s, as a consequence and a response to the crisis situation (drought, contraction of the peanuts' price, structural adjustment, demographic growth), migratory flows experienced an extension and diversification: new areas, groups and social classes were strongly affected by international departures, particularly Wolof of the rural central regions, while new countries of immigration, such as Italy, Spain and USA become more and more important. In fact, the movement of people within Africa itself still plays an important role, since the 1990s Europe and USA have become preferred destinations for Senegalese migrants, accounting for more than a half of all the destinations (Fall 2010; Gehrold, Bunk 2011). In the 2000s Senegal, considered at the regional level also a host country with a relatively high degree of development, witnessed the increase of immigrations flows from West Africa (Blakewell, 2007; Ndoye et Grégoire 2008), becoming also a place of transit migration towards North Africa and Europe (Gehrold, Bunk 2011).

In many African countries, statistics are still incomplete and often unreliable. Even international sources can show great differences in quantifying emigrants and immigrants stocks and are not free from contradictions: UN-DESA reports in a recent document 209.398 as the number of Senegalese international migrants (UNDESA 2013), while in a joint publication with the OECD, the number of Senegalese migrants aged more than 15 years residing in one of the OECD countries are quantified in 248.400. In both cases, these figures appear underestimated if compared with other sources and estimations, which have quantified in between 2 and 3 million, the number of Senegalese living abro-

ad total a population of 12 million: almost 25% of the total population lives outside of the country (ACP-OIM 2010; ICMPD-OIM 2010; Fall 2010).

Conversely, data on immigrants living in Senegal differ depending on the sources examined, fluctuating between 220.000 and 325.000 people, 80% of which coming from African countries, in line with the average of the whole region (UNDESA 2009; ACP-OIM 2010; ICMPD-OIM 2010, Gagnon, Khoudour-Castéras 2012). Currently migration is a phenomenon affecting all social strata of the Senegalese population. Departures have become a generalized and cross cutting perspective concerning people coming from all regions and ethnic groups within the country, with different ages, sex, education and class¹. Insofar, international migration is the standard model of social advancement and young people's "career planning" increasingly directed towards the international labour market (Geddes 2007; Willems 2013). International migrations' social, economic, symbolic and cultural impact are highly visible in the Senegalese context, in urban as well as in rural areas (Tall 2009; Grillo, Riccio 2004). Migration in Senegal acts as a marker of class, a social classifier (Herrera, Carrillo 2010).

The international migrant is a central figure within Senegalese society, often celebrated by the local popular culture as a "modern hero" (Riccio, 2005), assuming new social prestige and status both at the individual and collective level. More recently, a migrant's social image turned into a more nuanced vision also including negative aspects (degli Uberti, 2010) and the discourses about the desirability of migration to Europe are adapting to the changing structural circumstances affected by the economic crisis, reshaping the images of "elsewhere", migrants, as well as migrants' and non-migrants' imaginations of possible futures in the homeland (Hernandez Carretero, 2013). Migrants and the

¹ From the 2000's, a rise in the women's percentage of Senegalese migrants in Italy has been recorded, as well as a phenomenon of 'feminization' of the migratory patterns, traditionally centred on the male first migrant (Ceschi, Lulli 2012).

narratives about them can not only report the transformations affecting both sending and receiving contexts, but become metaphors through which rethinking these transformations and placing them in the usual context of life "at home" (Gaibazzi, 2010).

The Senegalese Transnational Diaspora

Senegalese culture, social relationships, values and representations, as well as Senegalese economic perspectives, political discourses and state policies, both at national and local level, are strongly interlinked with the dynamics, the effects and the social construction of migration. One of the reasons of this intertwinement lays in the characteristics of the Senegalese diaspora. Many scholars remarked that Senegalese collectivities abroad have a high degree of social and cultural cohesion as well as a persistent attachment and sense of belonging to the homeland (Ceschi 2001; Riccio 2002). Generally, Senegalese are capable of maintaining relationships, contacts and affective ties with their family and their community; build instrumental projects in the sending context; practice temporary returns and cultivate the idea of a definitive reinstallation in their home country. These migratory feelings and their individual and social organization in forms of solidarity, networks and associations, initiatives towards the context of origin, remittances and returns, make this expatriate community a "diaspora".

The sense and the use of the term diaspora has changed through the last two or three decades, moving towards a larger and more inclusive meaning². Diasporas are now postula-

² From a historical approach, for which diaspora referred to forced displacement of populations (Jewish, Armenians, Afro-Americans, Palestinians), to a political-cultural approach developed during the 1980s and the 1990s which called diasporas as collective actors residing abroad which, maintain a clear sense of "us" and strong material and symbolic ties with co-nationals and the home country (Clifford 1997, Appadurai 1996, Sheffer 1986), despite the assimilation paradigm and expectations. This second conceptualization stretched the use of the term diaspora to include any foreign born population 'deterritorialized', still producing forms of 'ethnicity' (Levy 2000; Vertovec & Cohen 1999; Cohen 1997) and containing elements such as solidarity and trust,

ted as collective actors acting in transnational fields which produce, from a 'long distance', forms of belonging and economic, social and political mobilisation oriented towards the development of their country of origin. 'Diaspora' has been mainstreamed in international development, as a new actor emotionally connected with the homeland and collectively engaged in the creation of a differential identity from the context of destination, and especially, being actively involved and politically situated in favour of the development of the home country (Ceschi, 2011).

This precisely suits the Senegalese community abroad, which is actively engaged in collective spontaneous solidarity actions³ towards the homeland, through donations, support to social activities and needs, community development initiatives. At the same time, this nationality of immigrants has easily entered into co-development programs and initiatives promoted by international organisation, by national and local governments or by the civil society and private bodies⁴ in the last fifteen years.

The encounter between grassroots initiatives and structured co-development schemes⁵ has generally increased the impact of diaspora activities on the sending context, providing migrants with a voice claiming clear

political and cultural loyalty as well as responsibility and engagement towards the place of origin (Anteby-Yemini, Berthoumière 2005). This introduces a third meaning of diaspora, which led to a further vulgarisation of the term, towards a developmental meaning of diaspora, employed by governments, international organisations and various cooperation and co-development actors.

3 Generally these kinds of socially oriented initiatives are undertaken by groups of migrants coming from the same places of origin or, conversely, (but less frequently) residing in the same area of destination, and are driven by the common will to improve the community life's conditions and to reassure the local population about their persistent engagement.

4 This is particularly true in the case of Italy, where the main co-development programs such as MIDA Italy and Fondazioni4Africa-Senegal have both concerned the Senegalese community. See Ceschi (ed.) 2012.

5 Convergence of spontaneous and informal solidarity initiatives and the more structured policy on Migration & Development (or co-development) carried out by public and private institutions of different levels (international/multilateral, national, and local).

recognition and legitimacy, this way giving to their expectations and requests more powerful features both in the context of origin and destination (Mezzetti, 2011). The activism of the Senegalese diaspora has on the one hand directly stimulated the interest of many and diverse actors of the international and decentralized cooperation outside Senegal, producing tangible results in terms of the volume of the interchanges between the country and the places where the migrants live. On the other hand, it has impacted the relationship with Senegalese public and private realities. Senegalese national and local institutions, politics and policy in the recent years are engaged in a process of dialogue and negotiation with their citizens abroad.

This arena of confrontation has been taking place at different levels and involves many different actors on both sides: the Government and in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad (MAESE), other national institutions and technical agencies, local authorities, private and civil society institutions, on one hand, and official representations of the diaspora (*Conseil Supérieur des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur*⁶), federations, associations, entrepreneurs and home town organizations and networks, on the other hand. Of course, the dialogue of the diaspora with the Senegalese State (and society) is not free from problems and conflicts, but migrants' voice and actions are important factors which have been influencing the current mobilization of Senegalese public actors. In the next section we take in account the recent trends in the public policy towards the Senegalese abroad examining some on-going actions and results of this State/citizens relationship.

6 Initially created in 1995 with the aim of helping the Government in the management, protection and promotion of the Senegalese abroad it quickly paralyzed. The Conseil was revitalised in 2010-2011 and is actually composed by 75 members, of which 45 directly designed by the President of the Republic and 30 elected by diaspora representations. As a Consultative body, the Conseil has been contested by the Senegalese community abroad and is still not working as an inclusive and representative mean of collaboration between the Senegalese Government and the diaspora.

The Senegalese abroad and their role for internal politics and development

Before winning the presidential elections in Senegal in 2000, Abdoulaye Wade, dedicated one entire year to his electoral campaign from his residence in France. He recorded a video tape addressed to Senegalese migrants in France, the United States, Italy, Germany, and all those countries with a significant number of Senegalese abroad. He focused on issues relevant to immigrants, addressing several electoral promises to this potential constituency. Aware of migrants' economic weight and capacity to influence political choices of relatives at home, he offered migrants good arguments to convince family members back home to vote for him. He thus instrumentally focused on transnational connections as voting multipliers, creating an important economic mobilization of political supporters (Salzbrunn, 2002).

Following his appointment President Wade launched a personal "call" for more involvement and participation to the development of the home country and organised in July 2001 a symposium – Nouveau Partenariat avec les Sénégalais de l'Extérieur – involving various ministries, international organisations, and the Senegalese Diaspora. With Wade the diaspora became a new political interlocutor, confirmed during the presidential elections in 2007 by the creation of the movement *Alliance Internationale des Emigrés Sénégalais pour la Réélection du Président Wade* (Allies.org 2008; Coslovi et al., 2008).

In 2001, the symposium put forward a clear political will for finding practical solutions for protecting Senegalese abroad, as well as for fostering their involvement in national development policies, articulating the debate around two central issues: "what can Senegal do for Senegalese abroad" and "what can Senegalese abroad do for Senegal?" (Ndione and Broekhuis, 2006). The main outcomes, in terms of needs and priorities, have been translated in a Governmental Plan of Action (Plan d'Action – Nouveau Partenariat avec les Sénégalais de l'Extérieur, Juillet 2001), followed by

the creation in of the *ad hoc* Ministry for Senegalese Abroad⁷ in 2003, which absorbed and elaborated the plan of action in the strategic document known as *Lettre des Politiques Sectorielles des Senegalais de l'Exterieur* (LPS) in 2006 (Coslovi *et al.*, 2008: 47). This document was further modified in 2009, updated in 2011 and more recently revised. The LPS serves as the basis for developing policies and initiatives towards the Senegalese diaspora, adopting a participatory approach for its formulation and a holistic focus: from taking into account needs and claims of the Senegalese abroad to considering migrants' families left behind and the entire population/citizens living in the country.

In the next paragraphs we take into consideration three central themes/pillars in the dialectic and *do ut des* relationship between governmental institutions and the diaspora: migrants' political participation, economic/entrepreneurial investments, social protection.

Do ut des relationship between governmental institutions and the diaspora

Regarding political participation, as already mentioned, the diaspora has a weight in determining electoral results both by voting from abroad as well as by influencing relatives' electoral behaviour. Senegalese institutions have thus put in place several measures in the last years to reinforce their links with Senegalese abroad which include: a) the re-dynamisation of the Conseil Supérieur des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur (CSSE) in 2010; b) the election of a Member of Parliament elected abroad appointed as 3rd deputy president of the National Assembly; c) the nomination of 5 Senegalese abroad in the Senate⁸; d) the nomination of Economic and Social Counsellors among also diaspora representatives⁹.

7 With the new government in 2012 the Ministry of Senegalese Abroad has been absorbed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, re-named MAESE, *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur*.

8 Senators are designated by the President of the Republic (65%) and by local collectivities (see FIIAPP, 2012).

9 The Economic and Social Council constitutes a consultative assembly disposing expertise in the economic social and cultural

Given the proliferation of diaspora associations spread abroad and involved in transnational activities towards Senegal, the idea of creating a body which can "represent" them in their interlocations with state actors is absolutely comprehensible. However the ways in which representatives have been appointed received many critiques from overseas Senegalese which in many instances do not recognise the CSSE as the unique interlocutor with the Government. A revision of the appointing system should be realised in order to re-legitimise the CSSE.

The second pillar reflects the more classical "developmental" meaning of the word diaspora, and is directed at supporting and attracting investments/entrepreneurial competences of Senegalese abroad. Interestingly, besides two big programs financed by Italy and France (respectively Plasepri and PAISD¹⁰, representing co-development programs funded by these two countries' cooperation) which we don't analyse as they are discussed in different contributions of this issue¹¹, different measures have been developed and adopted by Senegal. These include for example the creation of a fund, FAISE - Fonds d'Appui à l'Investissement et aux Projets, created in 2008, which is a financing tool for initiatives run by Senegalese abroad¹²; a guide, namely *Le Guide des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur*¹³ and

domains in front of public powers (President of the Republic, Government, National Assembly etc.). The Council is composed by a president and 24 members, nominated by decree.

10 For Plasepri with its allocation of 20 Million euro for credit aid and subventions for 3.7 Million by Italy, for PAISD 9 Million Euro by France, the Senegalese state has been able to contribute respectively with 350.000 Euro and 745.000 Euro.

11 See contribution by Francesca Datola in this issue.

12 The FAISE has been able to fund, since its inception, 65 bankable projects for a total amount of 330 million F CFA. The state is conscious of the limited resources and is committed to raising them, for example relying on the credit line issued by Plasepri (cfr. LPS). Despite resources the instrument is considered extremely valuable and institutions have been explicit in willing to give continuity to this financing tool.

13 The guide contains useful information on civil state, consular matriculation, and social and health protection. Equally it informs on formalities for creating an enterprise as well

a structure which shall be established also in the regions and abroad namely the *Bureau d'Accueil, d'Orientation et de Suivi* which can follow and orient Senegalese abroad that want to invest as well as those that wish to return.

Shortcomings exist within these initiatives, such as the need for augmenting resources for the FAISE and the ability to give continuity to such tools and measures that would allow Senegalese abroad to commit and undertake investment decisions in mid-long term perspectives. In addition, besides these specific measures for attracting investments from abroad, structural policies must be envisaged and undertaken, coupled with anti-corruption measures, trying to "re-conquer" trust between governmental institutions and Senegalese abroad, which is key for establishing long-lasting collaborations, partnerships, investments etc.

Extending universal social protection to all citizens, especially vulnerable groups, is the third pillar we shall reflect upon, considered since last elections¹⁴ a core governmental action. The Presidents' commitment in this domain is strong, willing to integrate migrants' social protection in public policies, thus considering migrants central elements of the Senegalese population. In practical terms this has been translated in mainstreaming sectorial policies specific for Senegalese abroad or on universal health coverage in the *SNDES 2013-2017, Strategie de Développement Economique et Social*¹⁵ (2012). In this context, high level authorities expressed a concrete interest in negotiating and ratifying conventions on social security and for the

as existing possibilities in the habitat domain as well as concerning money transfer/remittances.

14 Last elections in Senegal were held in 2012. Mr. Macky SALL was elected President. Sall was a long-time member of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS). After coming into conflict with Wade, he was removed from his post as President of the National Assembly in November 2008; he consequently founded his own party and joined the opposition. Placing second in the first round of the 2012 presidential election, he won the backing of other opposition candidates and prevailed over Wade in the second round of voting, held on 25 March 2012.

15 <http://www.gouv.sn/Strategie-pour-la-croissance-et-la.html>; <http://www.gouv.sn/Validation-politique-de-la.html>

protection of migrants, whereby the effective implementation of existing conventions especially in destination countries crucial for Senegalese migrants (i.e. West and Central Africa and France) is definitely a priority, on which the diaspora presses and raises growing expectations¹⁶. In order to achieve these goals at the institutional level, coordination mechanisms have been put in place, involving key and different institutions/ministries and stakeholders¹⁷. This process has been developed through a multi-dimensional and inclusive approach, which saw the participation of non-state actors as well as diaspora representatives, setting the basis for further collaborations among this potential network of stakeholders. Senegal is currently at the forefront in the region in committing to social protection and may play in the near future a key role at the CIPRES¹⁸ level for extending/replicating its expertise in this domain with neighbouring countries.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the dialogue between a State and its citizens abroad is an ongoing process, which despite many weaknesses and contradictions, represents a central arena for determining future paths and opportunities for the country. The interplay between migration, its widespread effects, and the Senegalese society (and State) is so strong, deep, and complex that the former has become one of the main social changing factors of the latter. Senegalese politics cannot ignore this and can continue to invest for harmonizing and furthering the coherence of policies, maintain a transparent and updated communication as in the precedent years, preserving

16 The project Bureaux d'Appui au Sénégalais de l'Extérieur (BASE) is meant to work also through consulates and embassies gives special attention also to social protection issues (as well as administrative matters, etc.).

17 This has been partly experimented, for example, through a specific EU funded project MeDAO, within which an action plan precisely supporting the negotiation and ratification process has been implemented. Cfr: <http://migrationdev.blogspot.it/p/accueil.html>. For further information also see: FIIAPP, CeSPI, GIP International, 2012.

18 *Conférence Interafricaine de la Prévoyance Sociale*, the organism which controls and gives technical assistance to African Social Security Funds of member states. For more details see <http://www.lacipres.org/>

its' focus – with the objective of achieving measures of social cohesion - not just on migrants but on the entire population, envisaging also innovative forms of S-S and triangular cooperation on issues of migration.

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African Renaissance Monument

Dakar, 24 March 2011, Photo | Jeff Attaway

IMAGINING EUROPE: BEING WILLING TO GO DOES NOT NECESSARILY RESULT IN TAKING THE NECESSARY STEPS

FINDINGS FROM THE EUMAGINE RESEARCH PROJECT REVEAL THAT PREVAILING MIGRATORY ASPIRATIONS OFTEN FAIL TO MATERIALIZE IN ACTUAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO GO ABROAD. WHILE EUROPE IS THE MOST COVETED DESTINATION, POVERTY AND MISERY ARE NOT THE SOLE DETERMINANTS. SENEGALESE INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REFLECTS A GREAT DEAL OF THIRST FOR EMANCIPATION THAT GOES ALONG WITH THE CLAIM FOR A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT: THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.

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Intro

The original research carried out in the framework of the *Imagining Europe from the Outside* project shed new light on the Senegalese migratory process. Indeed, the study of Senegalese inter-

national mobility is deeply affected by the lack of relevant and up-to-date data, which would allow for a thorough analysis of this phenomenon. It is to fill this gap that research was car-

ried out in four geographic areas that are representative of the main Senegalese migratory contexts, mainly:

1. A religious city and its hinter-




Figure 2. Gender and migratory aspirations. Source : Surveys Eumagine Senegal 2010-2013

thousands of Senegalese would like to emigrate. Indeed, at the national level, about 3/4 of the population states that they would like to leave their country within the next five years (table 1).

thanks to a long tradition of emigration towards Africa and France.

The desire to leave Senegal does not however mean a total separation from




Figure 3. Migratory aspirations and practical steps taken in terms of passport possession. Source: Survey Eumagine Sénégal 2010-2013.

Within the four geographic research areas, the proportion of respondents who would like to leave the country varies between 64 and 82%. It should be highlighted that the migratory aspirations are influenced, in variable proportions, by parameters such as gender, age, the area of origin, etc. The strongest prevalence of positive migratory aspirations has been reported in the Senegal river valley that is connected to the external world

the country of origin. On the contrary, migration is fundamentally seen as a time in life that offers opportunities to enhance the living conditions of those staying in the home country, and/or an opportunity to ensure a better future to the returning migrants (Ba 2010; Fall 2008; Fall & Gamberoni 2010; Sinatti 2014).

Understanding migratory aspirations is important for at least two main reasons:

1. To begin with, these aspirations are an important dimension of migratory dynamics. Even though most of the people who would like to go abroad would never have the opportunity to do so because of the migratory protectionism or a lack of means, the overflowing migratory ambition affects people's daily life. This situation makes it all the more necessary to achieve a more effective management of the migratory issues as it also affects the behaviors of those who are lucky enough to go abroad.

2. The second reason that justifies the study of migratory aspirations is that they may somehow affect the management of household revenues. Indeed, negative impacts may result from the allocation of the households' few resources in vain exodus trials and, as well, the ambition to invest in one's native country may be thwarted by migratory plans that are unlikely to succeed.

To review migratory aspirations, the people surveyed were asked to answer the following question « If you had the opportunity, would you like to go abroad to live or work there in the next five years, or to stay in Senegal? ».

Figure 2 illustrates the importance of positive migratory aspirations if they are studied in terms of gender and research areas. Although Senegalese migrations are male oriented, this illustration highlights the fact that the will to go abroad is widely shared by both women and men. The gender differences are evidently not important in Golf Sud/Dakar and Lambaye, but appear clearly in Darou Mousty and Orkadiéré.

Willing to go does not result in taking the necessary steps to leave the country

A major difference is noted between the positive migratory aspirations and actually taking the necessary measures to materialize the will to go abroad. Our investigations help evaluate the proportion of individuals who have taken the measures required for their migration. In that respect, the visa application, the foreign university pre-registration and the search for information on job markets






Figure 4. Senegalese favorite destinations per research area

outside Senegal are major indicators. Figure 3 indicates the proportion of men and women, in each of the research areas, who have undertaken initiatives towards facilitating their departure for migration, as well as the number of migration candidates already holding a passport⁴. Several lessons from this figure are worth highlighting: to begin with, its comparison with figure 2 indicates a huge gap between migratory aspirations and the readiness to implement the will to migrate. The majority of the candidates for migration had not undertaken any initiative towards that goal as they do not even hold a passport and have not taken any steps towards achieving the will to go abroad.

The large amounts of money required for the departure for migration is a discriminating factor in the achievement of the exodus plans and the choice of destinations⁵. If the wealthy-

4 Because the passport stands as the document required for travel across borders, its possession demonstrates a migratory decision and/or a will to leave Senegal. There is saying among the Senegalese youths that "the horns never precede the head" meaning that one should always get ready as one never knows when the opportunity will show up.

5 The cost of a short term visa valid in the Schengen area was 60 euros, about 40 000 FCFA, to which would be added the fees of the delegate service provider amounting to 19,20 euros or 13 000 FCFA. These expenses are not refundable in the case of visa denial. The applicant should in addition purchase a travel in-

est can only fund the migration of one of their relatives towards Northern countries (Northern Europe and America), less wealthy candidates have no other choice than Africa, or getting involved in dangerous expeditions by sea or across the desert. (Schapendonk 2012; Bredeloup & Pliez 2005 ; Brachet 2007)⁶.

insurance policy whose cost varies between 19,82 euros (9 750 FCFA) for a week and 57, 17 (35 000 FCFA) for 6 months. Furthermore applicants are requested to show income proof documents (salary sheet, financial statements) together with other documents such as the passport whose issuance requires the purchase of a 30 to 49 euro tax stamp, etc. For more insight into the red tape and other tricks, please refer to Francesca Zampagni's (2010) text « A Visa for Schengen's Europe. Consular practices and regular migration from Senegal to Italy », CARIM-VI Summer School on Euro-Mediterranean Migration and Development.

6 In 2006, the "sea madmen" paid between 40000 and 60000 FCFA, about 610 to 915 Euros to join the Canary Islands at the risk of their life. See: Fall Papa Demba « Ndaraw, Sekka, Sidi Bara, Yéri et al. Investigations in the mbëkk in the Dakar suburb », Communication delivered at the Seminar of the IFAN Cheikh A. Diop Scientific Committee on *Barça ou Barsa: quelles lectures des Sciences sociales sur l'actualité des migrations internationales ?* Dakar or "Les voyages dangereux. Les mobiles et le coût humain de la migration irrégulière en partance d'Afrique au sud du Sahara", Communication au ESF Exploratory Workshop on *The Human Costs of Border Control in the Context of EU Maritime Migration Systems*. Amsterdam, Netherlands, October 25-27th 2009.

Secondly, the gender differences are more marked if we take into account the steps taken by the candidates and/or the fact of holding a passport in contrast to migratory aspirations. This is not certainly applicable in the case of Golf Sud, which is a less conservative area, but the remark is obvious in the other research areas where there are three times more men holding passports than women;

Thirdly and finally, the prevalence of measures taken toward achieving the will to immigrate is stronger in Golf Sud where at least one respondent out of 5 has taken the necessary steps towards leaving the country. Indeed, contrary to the other research areas, the high level of education of the people surveyed is a valuable asset for access to information most often regarding the continuation of their higher education, the consultation of Internet websites, the search for agencies funding departures, etc. The socio-economic situation of the middle class families ensures as well the funding of migration.

Today Europe is the most coveted destination of the Senegalese

There are major differences between the research areas in terms of the selected migratory destinations. These findings were obtained from a subsidiary question asked to the people with a positive migratory aspiration and related to the destination they would choose if they were given all the guarantees regarding their stay and employment in a foreign country. Generally the choices are a reflection of the traditional migratory systems and of the present transnational mobility systems respectively represented by the Senegal river valley and the Wolof land. (Traoré 1994; Chart *et al.* 2012-2013). In the Senegalese Groundnut Basin (Darou Mousty and Lambaye), where emigration candidates can hardly demonstrate strong vocational skills, Italy (Fall 1998) is the most coveted destination, with Spain coming second place. (Fall & Garreta-Bochaca 2012).

In comparison to the other three research areas, Golf Sud/Dakar highlights a wider diversity in terms of choice. No destination attracts more




Figure 5. Migratory aspirations in terms of perceptions of Senegal and Europe.

Aggregate of the findings from the four research areas Source: Survey Eumagine Sénégal 2010-2013

than a third of the potential candidates to migration. Some European countries other than the current destinations such as France, Italy and Spain also appear as first ranking destinations: Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Greece, etc. More than any other country, the North American countries (USA and Canada) are the countries most coveted by the middle class. These respondents are more educated than their countrymen from the other emigration basins and consequently have more access to information sources such as the international media and the Internet.

By contrast, in Orkadiéré, France, while it is losing favor in the other research areas is, for 80% of the respondents, the favorite destination of the candidates to migration. This results mainly from the power of the solidarity networks of « the people from the valley » (Adams 1977 ; Diop 1968 ; Gonzalès 1994 ; Dia 2010).

Emigration is equally based on democratic aspirations

Several issues relating to the perception of Europe and Senegal have been

dealt with in the survey to understand the determinants of emigration. They are related to topics as important as health, education, corruption, security and job opportunities. These issues that have to do with human rights and democracy are appreciated both in Senegal and Europe. The information collected has helped develop a scale of perceptions of Europe and Senegal that are then used to design a comparative grid of the two entities.

The data collected indicate that, all other things being equal, the overwhelming majority of the respondents have a slightly more positive perception of Europe than of Senegal. A second group of surveyed respondents have a perception that is neither favorable to Europe nor to Senegal. The aggregated findings can be deconstructed as follows:

1. People with a far more positive perception of France than of Senegal are very inclined to emigration but their number is very low: 9 individuals;
2. Respondents with a perception radically more positive of Senegal are far less numerous: 3 people;
3. The central clusters of the fig-

ure comprise respondents with few variations in their perceptions of Europe and Senegal. About ¾ of the respondents would like to go abroad in the next five years.

People with a more positive perception of Europe than of Senegal would be expected to be more inclined to migration, but the data collected in the field does not clearly reflect this expectation. Indeed the prevalence of the migratory aspirations varies according to the relative perception that people have of Europe or Senegal, but are not determined by a radically more positive perception of Europe or of Senegal. Europe's economic opportunities are certainly highly appreciated by the respondents, just like some aspects of life in Senegal such as solidarity and family life. The attraction of the European continent on the Senegalese candidates to emigration is no less a reality based on a penchant for democracy and human rights.

Conclusion

Due to the growing number of migration candidates that it attracts, the Old Continent is called upon to address the demand for mobility from the South. The Senegalese example that was chosen to illustrate this discussion indicates that international migration is not dictated solely by poverty or misery. It also reflects a great deal of thirst for emancipation that goes along with the claim for a fundamental right, in this case the freedom of *movement*. In that respect, the adoption of bold policies in terms of circulatory migration would address not only the development challenges in the country of origin but would also address the labor needs of the Northern countries.

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Demonstration for Mor Diop Samb Modou, Florence

Florence, Italy - 17 December 2011 | Photo Lorenzo Ridi

EU MIGRATION POLICIES AND THE CRIMINALISATION OF THE SENEGALESE IRREGULAR MIGRATION FLOWS

SENEGAL CONSTITUTES A SIGNIFICANT SOURCE FOR IRREGULAR MIGRATION TO EUROPE. THE ATTEMPT OF THE EU TO STOP OR THWART ESTABLISHED MIGRATION ROUTES THROUGH STRICTER MIGRATION POLICIES HAS INVARIABLY LED TO THE PROLIFERATION OF ILLEGAL OUTLETS AND NETWORKS. AT THE SAME TIME MORE SUBTLE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES HAVE OFTEN REFLECTED AN ARROGANT EUROCENTRISM.

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Introduction

Over the years, African migrants, believing Europe to be full of opportunities, have continuously attempted to cross EU borders to escape the myriad of push factors in their home countries. This exodus has generated a number of reactions in migration policy reform from destination countries in Europe (initially, Italy, Spain and Malta). In fact, the border zones between Europe and the Maghreb

countries of North Africa are fast becoming graves for scores of African youth in their attempts to either swim across the Mediterranean, walk across the desert, or scale the tall fences (often with barbed wire and security cameras) of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.

In October 2013 alone, more than 300 African migrants drowned in

the Mediterranean Sea on separate occasions over a two week period¹. Such incidents are increasing, with the deaths of migrants attempting to cross the Sea becoming an almost dai-

¹ The Guardian 2013: 'Death Toll of African Migrants Rises after Boat Disaster near Lampedusa'. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/12/african-migrants-boat-lampedusa-capsizes-mediterranean>. Accessed on 03/03/2014.



ly occurrence. Unfortunately, victims include women, men and children, cutting across all age and gender dimensions.

Since the 1990s, trans-Saharan and trans-Mediterranean irregular migration has attracted the interest of many EU countries who perceived the issue to be of common concern and who agreed Italy, Spain and Malta should not be left alone to tackle the challenge. Consequently, trans-Mediterranean² migration has become a key issue on the EU policy agenda, resulting in a number migration policy reforms. Some policies have included exerting pressure on North African countries to clamp down on irregular migration within and through their territories by increasing border control operations, strengthening migration legislation, re-admitting irregular sub-Saharan migrants from Europe and deporting migrants back to their own national territories³. These policies have disproportionately affected migrants from sub-Saharan Africa given the fundamental shift in trans-Mediterranean migration in the late 1990s. It was during this period that sub-Saharan migrants began to join migration flows from the Maghreb, with migrants who had already started crossing the Mediterranean illegally as a result of the introduction of visa requirements for North African workers by Italy and Spain. The journey was completed primarily by using fishing boats (*pateras*),⁴ which exposed migrants many grave hazards at sea.

This commentary examines select EU migration policies and their impact on irregular migration flows from Senegal (a major country of origin in Africa) to Europe. The brief also examines specific migration policies, including the criminalization of irregular migration, securitization of EU borders, as well as forced expulsion from European territories. The impli-

cations of irregular migration, which is framed in terms of its magnitude in comparison with regular migration to Europe and within the African context, are also discussed. Policy recommendations are provided in order to improve the management of the flow of Senegalese migrants to Europe and other destination countries.

Patterns and trends of Senegalese Migration

The correspondence between patterns of migration and socio-economic development may be described as being directly related. Socio-economic factors constitute what are referred to as 'push and pull factors'⁵ in migration literature. Shortly after independence, Senegal was a major destination country for most West African migrants. For example, political asylum-seekers from Guinea fleeing the repressive regime of President Sekou Toure constituted the largest group of migrants in Senegal. This was highlighted by the fall in the Guinean migrant population in Senegal from 300,000 to 45,000 after the demise of President Toure.⁶ Similarly, as a result of the war in Guinea-Bissau, 75,000 migrants left the country and moved to Senegal in the early 1970s; however, there was a sharp decline to about 7,100 migrants from Guinea-Bissau in the 1990s⁷. Nonetheless, increasing population growth coupled with a declining Gross Domestic Product and concomitant rise in unemployment represent key push factors marking the transition of Senegal from a net-immigration to a net-emigration country.⁸ Senegalese have increasingly migrated to countries such as Mauritania, Mali, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau within the West African sub-region. However, certain events in these traditional destination countries have served as additional push factors for onward migration among Senegalese migrants, including

xenophobic attacks on Senegalese in the Ivory Coast, which began in the 1990s and culminated in direct and violent attacks of Senegalese migrants in the wake of the Ivorian 2002 civil war. Likewise, the restriction of fishing rights for Senegalese migrants in Mauritania led to a decline of the number of Senegalese in the country, which had been a preferred destination of Senegalese migrants due to its close geographical proximity⁹.

Generally, the economic and political crises in many West African countries have led to a shift in the migration trend from within the sub-region to other parts of Africa, especially South Africa. Since 1994, with the fall of the apartheid regime, many migrants from across Africa have perceived South Africa as a major destination country. Hence, migrants from Senegal and other African countries like Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Uganda have moved to South Africa for employment opportunities. It is pertinent to note that most Senegalese migrants are low-skilled and are involved in commercial activities, especially in the selling of artefacts from Senegal, hair-dressing and other low-paid service sectors.^{10,11,12}

However, Senegalese have also been reported to migrate to Northern Africa, with the ultimate aim to reach Europe as a final destination. Senegal, along with other West African countries like Nigeria and Ghana dominate migration flows to Europe and North America, representing 25.5, 16.4, and 12.2 percent of all West African migrants living in OECD countries, respectively¹³. The migration dynamics of Senegalese outside the African continent initially followed the colonial corridor; hence, Senegal accounts for

2 Trans-Mediterranean migration is defined as the movement of people (mostly irregular migrants) across the Mediterranean Sea to Europe as a result of strict migration policies in most EU states.

3 De Haas, Hein (2007). *The Myth of Invasion: Irregular Migration to the Maghreb and the European Union*. IMI Research Report

4 Ibid.

5 'Push factors' are those factors which are responsible for migrants leaving a country while 'pull factors' are those factors present in destination countries that attract potential migrants.

6 Gerdes, Felix (2007) Focus Migration: Senegal Country Profile. Hamburg Institute of International Economics.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Adepoju, Aderanti (2004)

11 Van Criekinge (2008) The EU-Africa Migration Partnership: A Case of the EU's Migratory Dialogue with Senegal and Ghana

12 Zubrzycki, Bernada (2012) Recent African Migration to South America: The Case of Senegalese in Argentina. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*. Volume 2 no. 22. Pp. 86-94

13 International Organisation for Migration (2008) *World Migration 2008 Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy*, IOM, Geneva.

the highest contribution of migrants to France and other OECD countries in sub-Saharan Africa. [For instance, in 2005, there were 82,116 Senegalese in France.¹⁴] However, the introduction of compulsory visas for Senegalese diverted the migratory flow from France to other destination countries in Europe and North America. A new trend in Senegalese migration is the south-south migratory flow. As a result of restrictive policies in the EU and USA, there has been a diversification in the Senegalese migratory flow whereby migrants have begun to move to non-conventional destinations, where they have no existing linguistic, cultural or colonial bonds. This is typified by the Senegalese migration flow to non-EU countries like Argentina¹⁵.

Criminalisation of Irregular Migration

In recent years, the politics of immigration and migration management across the EU have been characterised by punitive measures aimed at deterring irregular migrants. The criminalisation of irregular migration implies that irregular migrants are treated like criminals rather than solely as violators of administrative rules and procedures.¹⁶ This development has evolved given the associations between irregular migration and a myriad of criminal endeavours including terrorism, smuggling, human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, most EU member states have agreed that better management of the Union's external borders will help to combat parallel criminal activities linked to irregular migration. There were an estimated 1.9-3.8 million irregular migrants in the EU in 2008,¹⁷ yet from 2004-2008, Lampedusa Island in Italy and the Canary Islands in Spain were noted as the most notorious 'back-

door' EU entrances from Western and Northern Africa. In 2006, about 23,000 irregular migrants entered the Canary Islands between January and September. Meanwhile, the Mediterranean remains the traditional entry point for irregular migrants, with recent figures suggesting an increase in land-border crossings from 55 percent in 2009 to 86 percent in 2010¹⁸. However, the number of illegal border-crossing detections into the EU peaked during the Arab Spring, with about 59,000 detections¹⁹. In responding to irregular migration, different countries have used various approaches, including strict border control tactics and raids in establishments and communities where migrants work and live. Criminalisation, however, entails that migrants, like asylum-seekers and refugees, who should ordinarily be entitled to certain considerations from destination countries, are treated instead as criminals, imprisoned and later deported, usually under inhumane circumstances.

Criminalisation has led to further debates as to the adequacy of subsequent measures to manage irregular migration in light of the violations of migrants' rights during the process. EU policies aimed to stem the flow of irregular migrants from the global south, a large percentage of whom come from Africa, have included initial reactions by individual member states. One of the early responses was the introduction of visas in the 1990s, prior to which no visa had been required (for example, in Italy and Spain). Tall barricades and high-tech security devices were also installed along the Italian and Spanish borders to ward off irregular migrants. Collectively, Integrated Border Management (IBM) schemes were adopted by the EU, such as the *acquis communautaire*²⁰ on the management of internal and external borders typified by the

Schengen Code, and the externalisation and sub-contracting system of managing migration.

A major player in the externalisation process is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Coordination at the External Borders of Member States (FRONTEX). FRONTEX has played a key role as the coordinating agency for the EU and provides leadership to guide member states in conducting collaborative policing, not only along the EU borders but in third countries, as well.²¹ In 2006, the EU deployed the FRONTEX mission - *HERA* - which was mainly run by the Spanish Border Services in partnership with select EU member states. In 2007, the EU implemented the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)²² programme to build the capacity of Senegalese authorities to combat irregular migration.

In addition to facing the securitisation and militarisation of most EU borders, irregular migrants have also been intercepted and deported before they reach EU territories. This approach was viewed as necessary given increasing difficulties in expelling irregular migrants after entry into the EU, particularly due to the fact that many migrants destroy all forms of identity documents providing give clues as to their countries of origin.

Ironically, criminalisation of irregular migration has led to more desperation among irregular migrants and to the enlargement of criminal networks specialized in the movement of people across borders. For instance, those who use the trans-Saharan migration routes make their journeys in several stages lasting for various lengths of time, ranging from one month to several years or even eternity (as many do not return to tell the story).²³

14 OECD Migration Data Base, (2005 cited in Van Criekinge (ibid.)

15 Zubrzycki, Bernada (ibid.)

16 Ikuteyijo, Lanre (2014) *The Impact of European Union Migration Policies on Irregular Migration in sub-Saharan Africa*. In *Territoriality and Migration in the EU Neighbourhood: Spilling over the Wall*. By Walton-Roberts, M. and Henneby (editors) Springer. Pp 97-110.

17 European Commission (2010) *First Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2009 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council)*, Brussels: European Commission.

18 Ifantis, K. (2012) *Addressing Irregular Migration in the Mediterranean*. Centre for European Studies

19 FRONTEX, (2013) *Annual Risks Analysis 2013*, pp. 19. Available at http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf (assessed on 17/03/2014).

20 Also known as *Community acquis* which is the aggregation of EU laws applicable in all member states.

21 Besides EU member states, other third countries which serve as transit points are also key partners of FRONTEX, including Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt.

22 The RRM operated on three major terms, including: *inter alia*; *provision of necessary facilities and training to Senegalese Naval Officers to combat irregular migration from Senegal, provision of assistance to voluntary returnees and capacity building in conducting comparative research on legislations on critical issues in irregular migration in Senegal and selected EU member states* (Van Criekinge).

23 International Organisation for Mi-



Migration Dialogue as Migration Management in the EU

In the face of rising advocacy by human rights groups around the world against the criminalisation of irregular migration and its subsequent measures, the EU and other destination countries have embraced more participatory migration management tools. These have been characterised by strategies that are less punitive and employ bilateral cooperation rather than the unilateral approach previously applied. The EU has therefore identified major sending countries²⁴ and has devised means of helping such countries to manage irregular migration by addressing push factors and helping irregular migrants to reintegrate into their countries of origin. For example, EU diplomatic missions have visited select African countries²⁵ to negotiate readmission agreements and secure cooperation in addressing irregular migration.

The most common form of migration dialogue between the EU and African countries (especially Senegal) is the 'mobility partnership,' which involves the granting of increased EU labour market access in exchange for cooperation on migration control.²⁶ In some instances, irregular migrants in destination countries are returned to their countries of origin with assistance packages from destination countries in order to hasten reintegration. While such a bilateral arrangement has existed for some time between France and Senegal,²⁷ the African country has recently gained more attention from other EU member states such as Spain

and Italy. This is due to the strategic geographic position of Senegal as a major point of departure for both regular and irregular migrants, thereby contributing to a major influx of irregular and low-skilled migrants in Europe. In addition, the countries in the southern axis of the EU (Greece, Malta, Italy, Cyprus, and Spain) are those most directly affected by the influx of irregular migrants.

However, negotiations between Senegal and the EU are still characterised by certain shortcomings, leaving Senegal to prefer to negotiate separately with specific EU member states. Talks concerning readmission programmes between the EU and Senegal have stalled twice (2006 and 2007) due to what the Senegalese Government terms long and bureaucratic bottlenecks in EU operations.²⁸ Another challenge of the partnership is that most terms are Eurocentric, with the EU dictating the conditions of the agreement. Generally, major areas of disagreement relate to the divergence of interests between the EU and the Senegalese Government. While the EU emphasises migration control using various 'carrot and stick' approaches, authorities in Senegal favour a migration management approach which enhances the development prospects of migration²⁹. Ultimately, Senegal is an important sending country which commands EU attention and the Government of Senegal is doing all it can to exploit the situation in order to maximize the migration-development nexus.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Senegalese migration dynamics have been quite interesting as the country has transited from a net-immigration to a net-emigration country. Moreover, the migration flow which previously remained largely within the African sub-region now extends beyond the continent, constituting a significant source of origin for irregular migration in the EU. Undoubtedly, this development constitutes a major challenge to both the EU and Senegal.

The attempt of the EU to stop or block established irregular migration routes and thwart migration through stricter migration policies has invariably led to the proliferation of illegal outlets and networks. While the EU cannot sustain the criminalisation and absolute restrictions to combat irregular migration through military and punitive measures, there is a need for the Senegalese Government to reflect on its own policies and begin to address the myriad of push factors within the country. There is also a need for dialogue to move beyond an analysis of the benefits for individual countries and to instead focus on employing a regional approach to address the challenges of irregular migration. Moreover, there is an urgent need for EU countries to help sending countries, including Senegal, to immediately address push factors propelling large numbers of youth to leave the country.

In addition, the issue of corruption has been the bane of development in most African countries and the EU can contribute to strengthening anti-corruption activities in this region. Senegal and other sending countries in Africa should also create an enabling environment for the African diaspora to invest in the local economy and foster return migration.

migration (2007) *Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union: An Overview of Recent Trends*. IOM Migration

Research Series. IOM, Geneva.

24 Some of the major sending countries in West Africa identified by the EU include Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali.

25 Senegal was among the first set of countries to be visited the EU Diplomatic Missions in 2006.

26 Chou, M., (2009) "European Union Migration Strategy towards West Africa: the Origin

and Outlook of 'Mobility Partnerships' with Cape Verde and Senegal," A Paper presented at the EUSA Conference, Los Angeles, April.

27 For example, in 1975, Senegalese migrants in France were encouraged to return to contribute to the development of their country of origin.

28 Van Criekinge Ibid.

29 See Van Criekinge, *ibid*





Gorée Island - Senegal

19 February 2008, Photo | Juan Falque

REFRAMING SENEGALESE YOUTH AND CLANDESTINE MIGRATION TO A UTOPIAN EUROPE

SITUATING MORE RECENT SENEGALESE MIGRATIONS WITHIN THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL AFRICAN DIASPORA HELPS TO PLACE THESE MOVEMENTS AS THE LATEST MANIFESTATION OF OVER 500 YEARS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN THE AFRICAN CONTINENT, WHICH HAS BOTH PRODUCED FORCED MIGRATIONS OF AFRICAN PEOPLES AS WELL AS CONTRIBUTED TO THEIR RESISTANCE AND RESILIENCE.

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Reframing Africa, Europe and the Global African Diaspora

Since the mid-1980s, stricter immigration control in most European Union (EU) member states has made it increasingly difficult for African migrants who are neither highly-skilled nor a family migrant or who do not meet the limited criteria for refugee status outlined by the 1951 UN Convention to enter the EU. Those who cannot enter Europe legally will do so “by any means necessary”.

According to the International Organization for Migration, since the beginning of 2014, 5,745 West African, East African and Syrian migrants have arrived in Sicily on boats origi-

nating in Libya. Thousands of African migrants have died trying to enter Europe. These include the more than 400 migrants, who lost their lives last October in two shipwrecks en route from Libya to the Italian island of Lampedusa. Their bleached bones strewn over the Sahara and buried in the forgiving sea are morbid testaments to the seductive “El Dorado” just beyond their reach.

Though migrants may have specific destinations in mind, “Europe” is configured as a monolith in much the same way “Africa” was and is imagined by Europeans. This utopian

imagining is in sharp contrast to the historical reality of a Europe that used the master tools of scientific racism to manufacture its racialised ‘Others’ and build the industries of transatlantic slavery and imperial expansion.

This cooperative complicity under the guise of ‘commerce’ and ‘civilising’ mission literally and figuratively aligned the destinies of Africans, diasporic and continental. Although coming from diverse backgrounds they are forever situated within the same unfolding grand narrative. As a result, since the sixteenth century (and even earlier), these circuits of



trade, processes of settlement, and political economic regimes have created co-terminal points of reference for African diasporic constituents in Europe as well as the Americas, the Caribbean and beyond. Furthermore, the long-term effects of under-development in Africa have given rise to new African diasporas that do not necessarily correspond to former colonial European or Commonwealth status. *The racialised, gendered and generational dimensions of these clandestine land and sea movements* from West and North Africa to southern Europe forces us to rethink what constitutes volition, agency, and victimization.

The precarious nature of these migrations of desperation demand that we address human rights concerns of protection, prevention and freedom. Undocumented migrants without legal citizenship do find community and create new forms of multiethnic and multinational migrant cosmopolitanism (Mbembe 2001). At the same time, as (in)visible strangers, they must labour in the shadows of informal and exploitative economies, where they are marked as racially different “crimmigrants”- a term Aas uses to describe stratification, non-citizenship and the interface of practices of surveillance and conditions of undocumented migration in the EU (2011: 343). The policing of “crimmigrant” bodies and Italy’s poor reception and detention conditions were evident during the aftermath of the 2013 Lampedusa tragedy, when degrading video footage of surviving migrants at a detention centre being hosed down was leaked to the press (Sunderland 2013).

The Global African Diaspora

The African Diaspora is an historical and discursive frame, which provides a holistic way for us to assess and address the different trajectories and forms of suffering of people of African descent; who, at different periods in history, have migrated to Europe, the Americas, the Caribbean and beyond in search of refuge, labour or as part of the subjugating missions of transatlantic slavery and colonisation. (Gomez 2005). *The African Diaspora has evolved as a useful frame for understanding these global movements*

and settlements (Ifekwunigwe, 2010). Spanning more than five centuries and still unfolding, the *unique gendered and racialised history of the Global African Diaspora*, whose cornerstones are resistance, resilience and innovation, is also in part, both a history of continental Africa and Fortress Europe. I organize the follow conceptualisation of the Global African Diaspora in terms of three key themes: 1) mapping and framing 2) historicising and 3) stratifying.

Mapping and Framing the Global African Diaspora

How we configure “Africa” impacts how we conceptualize the Global African Diaspora in general and African diasporas in Europe in particular. If we conceptualise “Africa” as below the Sahara we are reifying an Hegelian artificial construct and overlooking “the cultural and historical distinctiveness of the two regions, their overlap and their great diversity” (Osondu 2010:45). Including North Africa in our conceptualisations of continental Africa paves the way for our inclusion of the Maghreb as both an important transit zone and a destination for Africans en route to Europe. It also highlights older and established trade routes between North Africa and southern Europe: “...the shores of northern Africa and southern Europe enclose, like two cupped hands, the waters of the world’s most famous sea, perceived by the ancients as the very heart and center of the world” (Achebe 2009: 77).

This reconfiguration is particularly salient in light of the fact that contemporary European identity politics are drawn along more than one axis than ‘race’ (El-Tayeb 2011) and different European colonial projects gave birth to differing (post)colonial assimilationist models (Nimako and Small 2009). Shifting the frame so that it embraces the Mediterranean basin emphasizes the particularities of southern European immigration policies and politics.

Historicising the Global African Diaspora: Roots, Routes and Detours

In thinking historically about the African Diaspora, I link its formation to three phases, which I configure as

roots, routes and detours (Hall 1990, Gilroy 1996, Ifekwunigwe 2010). The first phase is roots, which encapsulates the dispersal of continental Africans as a result of the transatlantic slave trade, such as the forced migration of enslaved Africans from the transit centre of Gorée Island, Senegal, to the Americas and the Caribbean.

The second phase is routes, which includes the dispersal of people of African descent on the African continent as a result of the social and historical processes of imperialism, colonialism and their aftermath, such as the Senegalese to France.

The *third phase is detours*, which accounts for what I call contemporary *extra-colonial dispersals* of people of African descent, such as the Senegalese to Italy, Spain and Greece. By extra-colonial, I mean movements that do not adhere to former colonial and thus geopolitical relations between these sovereign African nations and their former European colonisers. There was a time when a geopolitical logic underpinned African migrations to Europe so that if one were from Senegal, a former Francophone colony, one would migrate to France. However, in 1974, this migratory route was disrupted by the legal closure of French borders to new international labour migrants and from the 1980s to the present day Spain and Italy have become the primary extra-colonial destinations for Senegalese migrants (Beuchemin, Caarls and Mazzucato 2013).

This geopolitical shift in migration patterns has contributed to the growth of transnational families as well as skewed gendered dynamics in Senegalese migrant communities. For example, in France, women comprise 46 percent of the Senegalese population whereas in Spain and Italy, women comprise 16 percent and 13 percent of the Senegalese population respectively (Beauchemin, Caarls and Mazzucato 2013: 18). With reachable roots and tangible ties with their countries of origin, contemporary African migrants in Europe in general and Senegalese migrants in particular, speak from multiple locations as transported and transplanted daughters and sons of “over-lapping” diasporas

(Lewis 1999). Paul Zeleza has devised the term “diasporas of structural adjustment” to describe these more recent movements:

...the diasporas of structural adjustment have been formed since the 1980s, out of the migrations engendered by economic, political and social crises and the destabilizations of structural adjustment programmes (2005: 55).

According to Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU, there have been several land and sea routes from continental Africa to the EU, which include Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes as well as the Western African route. In 2014, the preferred route for prospective North and West African clandestine migrants attempting to enter Europe is across the land border between Greece and Turkey:

This area of the external border neighbours Turkey and offers a natural transit bridge with Asia, which includes many source countries for migrants hoping to illegally cross the border to the EU...migrants from northern and western Africa willing to illegally cross the EU external borders, are expected to increasingly take advantage of the Turkish visa policies, granting visas to a different set of nationalities than the EU, and the expansion of Turkish Airlines, to transit through the Turkish air borders to subsequently attempt to enter the EU illegally, either by air or through the neighbouring land or sea borders (Frontex 2012, 39-40).

As long as the “aid-trade-debt nexus” (Cheru 2010:207) on the African continent persists, the EU will find it difficult to stem the tide of desperation that contributes to these clandestine migration flows; for, as one border is sealed another border is made porous.

Stratifying the Global African Diaspora

The Global African Diaspora is derived from a common heritage as well as shared legacies of and resistances to slavery, (post)colonialism, racism and other forms of structural inequalities. What the African Diaspora looks

like in a specific local context is determined by a complex set of economic, political and historical circumstances. For clandestine Senegalese migrants making their way to southern Europe, a contingent state of (un)belonging is fabricated both by their precarious undocumented status as well as by their racialised difference (Carter 2010, Merrill 2011).

In Fortress Europe, borders remain permeable for the transnational flow of capital, commodities and information, but not people. Across the EU, illegal immigration control is a hot button issue that polarizes political debates and public opinions. The rallying cry from the Right is contain ‘the Others’ already within and keep ‘those Others’ out. These outside ‘Others’ are exemplified by clandestine movements “by any means necessary” of the unwanted and the impoverished (as opposed to the ‘brain drain’ elites) from structurally (mal) adjusted West African urban centres to economically and demographically restructured Western and southern European metropolises.

These transnational migratory processes have included the smuggling of West African (such as, from Senegal, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Mali, Cameroon, and Guinea-Bissau) and North African (particularly Moroccan) women and men via North Africa across the Mediterranean to southern Europe, including Spain, Italy and Greece—the Gateways to Fortress Europe. The borders crossed are not just physical but also symbolic, economic and political. At the same time, the nation-state is both extraneous to transnational identities formation and integral to the everyday policing, surveillance, management and containment of racialised and gendered African diasporic bodies. The bio-politics and alterity of “diseased” African diasporic bodies are evident at the Los Cristianos port of Tenerife where Spanish officials wear protective gear including contagion masks and gloves in order to meet boat-loads of arriving Senegalese clandestine migrants (Ifekwunigwe 2013).

What motivates clandestine migrants is the promise of higher European Union (EU) wages. As was/is the case with older African diasporic forma-

tions, at every stage of the migration process, strategies are highly stratified (Ejike 2010). As agents and victims, youth and older adults, women and men, these ‘unofficial’ migrants deploy strategies which demonstrate both the potency of collective agency and the exigencies of survival. That is, clandestine migrant women and men may share a similar destination, but by virtue of their structural positions, their destinies will be very different.

In fact, irregular migration is conventionally enacted by men (Pickering and Cochrane 2012). For example, on the 18th of March, 2014, in the Spanish enclave on Moroccan territory of Melilla, 500 African migrant men, mostly Senegalese and Malians, successfully scaled the border fence and made their way to the immigration holding centre shouting “*Bosa, Bosa*”, which according to witnesses means “victory, victory” (El Pais 2014). Those women who do make these journeys are exposed to dangers and risks, particularly sexual assault, other forms of physical violence and ultimately death (IOM 2013). In a comparative analysis of the role of gender in border-crossing deaths, Pickering and Cochrane reported that women are disproportionately dying at “the global frontiers between the Global North and the Global South,” such as the 82 percent of women who died at the land and maritime borders between North Africa and the EU (2012: 39). The configuration of global cities and survival circuits also demonstrates the extent to which Senegalese migrant women and men in Spain, Italy and Greece participate in local economies in differential ways with women over-represented in the service sector labouring in the formal and informal economies as nannies, domestics or sex workers.

“Voting with their Feet”: Senegalese Youth and Clandestine Migration as Gendered Protest

With half the population of 12 million under the age of 18, Senegal is a youthful nation, which means that the Senegalese migrant population is a relatively young one (Melly 2011). The unemployment rate remains at almost 50% and 70% of the population lives on \$2 a day. Urban youth

comprise more than 40% of the 50% who are unemployed: "youth are permanently disarticulated from civil society" (Ralph 2008: 11). The ongoing social transformation of urban Senegalese youth from subordinates to local African moral traditions and values to champions of globalization and transnationalism, as channelled through the fusion of politics, arts and popular culture is in direct response to the perceived political and economic failings of the colonial independence project at the level of the family, the state and the nation (Diouf 2003, Herson 2011).

Social disarticulation breeds social dispossession. Reaching back into the annals of political economy as well as colonial and (post)colonial African history, I borrow from Tiebout (1956), Asiwaju (1976) and Herbst (1990) respectively to suggest that rather than being mere economic migrations, these movements are also migrations of protest. These individualized contemporary youthful Senegalese protest migrations are not to be confused with earlier and longstanding collective Murid trade diasporas (Buggenhagen 2012). They are both transnational in form and function. However, the specific purpose of Murid trade diasporas was the production of a global African commercial diaspora, which was still steeped in the foundational tenets of the Murid brotherhood (Diouf 2000).

Contemporary Senegalese youth protest migrations may have Murid ties, but more stringent immigration restrictions in Europe and the United States have transformed these migration chains: "Once considered a matter of exploiting social networks and seeking brotherly aid, migration is increasingly imagined as a matter of chance or luck, and as involving a personal engagement with risk" (Melly 2011, 368). Asiwaju defines a protest migration as "a series of unarmed but effective expressions of resentment" (1976, 578); in this case against a particular European colonial regime that was perceived to be more austere than another. Migrants moved from one colonized African region to another, such as from French West Africa to neighbouring Brit-

ish colonies on the Gold Coast (Asiwaju 1976). In the case, of Senegalese youth en route to southern Europe, a sort of "colonisation in reverse" (Bennett 1966/2000,16) takes place. Dissatisfaction with **neocolonial** conditions at home lead them to risk life and limb en route to the imagined paradise of Europe's southern frontier. One could argue, as Helff (2008) does, that these aspiring Europeans uphold the foundational ethos of an 'old' Europe and in doing so embody a more 'authentic' European identity than the subject-citizen Europeans who deny them entry, citizenship and humanity.

In "Titanic Tales of Missing Men" Melly suggests that it is the very nature of Senegalese society, as it is in constant transformation, that determines the differential role men and women play in these migration protests. Carretero-Hernández and Carling's ethnographic research also supports this claim: "notions of manhood, honor, pride, responsibility, and courage intertwine in accounts of the decision to embark on a pirogue to Europe" (2012, 411). The dreams of young Senegalese men are adrift on the Atlantic and more recently on the Mediterranean as they attempt to enter Europe to create employment opportunities that will generate income to send back to their extended families and also enhance their status as potential marriage candidates (Carretero-Hernández and Carling 2012).

Venables' ethnographic study of "Senegalese Women and the Cyber Café" reveals that young Senegalese women also have migration aspirations, which they hope to successfully accomplish by meeting European men online with whom they can form relationships and eventually relocate to Europe: "Whereas men seek temporary stepping-stones to the West through creating social and professional links with tourists or Europeans living in Senegal, women rely upon forming romantic and sexual relationships" (2008: 475).

Concluding Remarks

Young Senegalese men and women are both striving for opportunities in what they imagine to be the economic paradise of Europe. This latest (in)

voluntary transnational circulation of African peoples, of which Senegalese clandestine migrant men and women are a part, illuminates the complexities and politics of new African diasporic processes in the latest globalising age (Campbell 2010). The continual growth of new African diasporas of structural adjustment forces a re-assessment of the dialectics of structure and agency within which one must be mindful of the sexualised, racialised and gendered dynamics of migrant labor in informal and clandestine economies. *The persistence of globalised, racialised and gendered inequities* as manifest in the legal and social exclusion of clandestine African migrant women and men, en route to and living in the shadows in southern Europe, affirms the importance of viewing African/diasporic formations as dynamic, interconnected and historically contextualised and thus cyclical rather than static, arbitrary and ahistorical.

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Malikounda, Senegal

17 May 2012, Senegal, Photo | Franco Emilio Risso

SENEGALESE VALUES AND OTHER CULTURAL PUSH PULL FACTORS BEHIND MIGRATION AND RETURN

RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE MOTHER, AS WELL AS MOUGN (ENDURANCE), JOM (DIGNITY), AND FOULA (COURAGE), PROVIDE FOR A MIX OF CULTURAL VALUES THAT HAVE A GREAT IMPACT ON THE MIGRATORY PROJECTIONS OF YOUNG SENEGALESE IN SEARCH FOR SELF-VALIDATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, RELIGION, LANGUAGE, ETHNICITY AND OTHER CULTURAL DIMENSIONS HELP TO EXPLAIN THE MORE OR LESS RATIONAL NATURE OF RETURNS.

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Introduction

For the longest time, humans have migrated in search for better opportunities and a chance to improve their living standards. Each country in Africa has been affected by international migration. Migration has often been seen as a 'brain drain' instead of an opportunity. Technological progress facilitates the interaction between emigrants and their countries of ori-

gin and as such leads to the social and economic development of these countries. Until recently, few governments and institutions in Africa recognized the potential contribution that the diaspora could bring to the economic transformation of the continent. Despite the few steps taken in favor of migration and the fast amelioration of transport and communication tech-

nologies, free movement of population is still much slower than that of goods and capital services.

Recently, international migration has marked Senegal's economic and development process. Historically, Senegal is mainly a country of emigration because of the everyday life struggles that people often have to

face and the successful experiences of early emigrants. Emigrants coming back home are perceived as examples of success. They often have the most beautiful cars, the biggest houses and these exterior signs of wealth make more and more young people willing to go abroad in search of a better life. The conviction that one must travel to Europe whatever may the risk be is summed up in the wolof expression "**Barça mba Barzakh (Barcelona or Death)**". According to the World Bank about 463,000 Senegalese (or 4% of the population) were living abroad in 2005. The results from a household survey carried out by Senegal's Ministry of Economy and Finance (2008) show that 76% of urban households and 70% of households nationwide have at least one family member who lives abroad. A total of 46% have gone to Europe, where Italy, France and Spain are the most common countries of destination. A further 8% have gone to North America. There is a tendency for Senegalese migrants to remain in the destination country for long periods, even though a significant proportion of irregular migrants in industrial countries are deported within a short time. In general, however, Senegalese migrants plan their stays abroad as short-term experiences.

A study based on a sample of migrants residing in Germany shows that their wish for an early return to their home country has not come true for a number of reasons. Some have ended up starting a family abroad, while many others still feel obliged to continue meeting the financial needs of their dependent family in Senegal. There is also widespread fear of losing their social status in Senegal upon return. Through this article we will see how culture and the socio-economic environment can influence migrants' choice to return in their country of origin but also how their social reinsertion can be influenced by both of these factors.

Overview of Senegalese Social Classes

As in every society, Senegalese society is divided into three classes: the high class represented by the bourgeoisie, the middle class, and the lower income class. Both the high and the

middle classes are mainly composed of highly educated and well-off individuals. These two classes are the ones which insist more on having their children pursue their studies abroad rather than sending them over there for a chance at a better life. They therefore expect their children to come back in their home country once their studies are completed.

We will focus on Senegal's lower income class. This specific class is composed of individuals living day to day and facing the hardships often caused by lack of financial means. Most importantly, they are affected by the lack of possibilities to turn dreams into concrete opportunities.

For this part of Senegalese society, having a child living in Europe is a great deal. It means the achievement of their goals and dreams. For a mother from this lower income class, who raised her children doing her best to satisfy their needs, having her son or her daughter move to Europe is also a mark of self-validation. Most of the time, whether it is coming from the mother or the father, parents do not pay much attention to the way their son or daughter is living in Europe because they are convinced that to live in Europe cannot be worse than to live in Senegal no matter what. For this class of the society, a worker in Italy does not have the same status as a worker in Senegal, simply because the first one lives abroad with all the opportunities and the halo of wealth and success it represents. Consequently, the emigrants coming from this kind of family will be more reluctant to returning to Senegal if they did not succeed in their quest for success as it will be a great disgrace for them and for their entire family.

To better illustrate this situation I interviewed a friend who decided to go abroad to try his luck. To respect his privacy we will just use his initials and call him **WD**.

WD is a 36 years old Senegalese man, proud father of a two year old girl. He is the fifth son of a family of seven. His parents are not rich but did their best to finance WD's two first years of undergraduate studies. Like many

of his young fellow countrymen, WD was not able to have a decent job that is well paid and in accordance with his skills. When he decided to leave Dakar two years ago, WD was still living at his parents' and was completely cared for. His little girl's birth changed everything. It was a positive motivation to succeed at any price to be able to satisfy her needs.

He thus decided to leave Senegal *'two years ago with a tourist visa for France. My brother financed my travel and paid almost 3000000 CFA for me to get a six month visa. When I was leaving Senegal, my intention was not to stay in Europe for more than one year because I was convinced I would have a job as soon as I arrive in Paris. The first three months of my stay in Paris went by quite well. The fourth month, I had an argument with my sister's husband who was hosting me. I therefore left his home and went to stay with my best friend who also lived in Paris. The stay at his home became increasingly difficult because I was not able to get a job. Every day, I was told to marry a French girl to have my documents. One day he just asked me to leave – so I did. During the following two months, my goal was no longer to find a job, but to find somewhere to sleep at night and I just cannot tell you how many times I slept outdoors before I decided to go to Belgium and ask for asylum. After nine months spent in Belgium living quite the same experience, I went to Germany where I have been living since the past three months now. I asked for asylum again and I am awaiting the results. I promised my daughter's mother to come back if it does not work but I know from the bottom of my heart that I will not even though it is my strongest wish. I cannot go back because there is no way for me to go back home and live the same situation I lived before.'*

This story is similar to that of so many Senegalese living in Europe or in the rest of the world. This has surely to do with social class, but it also has to do with the Senegalese culture. The Wolof word "**Jom**" and "**Foula**" (dignity and courage) are primordial.

Senegalese Culture

It is important to define basic sociologic terms of identity to understand cultural identity. Culture is learned

and passed through generations and includes the beliefs and value system of a society. Culture has been described as features that are shared and that bind people together into a community. Identity is the totality of one's perception of self, or how we as individuals view ourselves as unique from others. Bhugra notes that racial, cultural and ethnic identities form part of one's identity, and identity will change with development at a personal as well as at a social level along with migration and acculturation

Senegal is a country that presents a rich cultural diversity. Whatever the ethnicity of the individual may be and whatever his or her social class, he or she has been raised with a spirit of submission to his or her parents. For Senegalese people, whatever their religion may be, parents have a great role in their life and also in their future. A Senegalese man or woman has been raised with the spirit to respect and to honor his or her parents, especially his or her mother. The Senegalese individual is one who has been raised bearing in mind that his or her mother has withstood a lot from his or her father (e.g. infidelity, nastiness of the step-family, etc.) because she wanted him or her to have a great life living with a united family. This refers to the '**Mougn'** (endurance) concept and, because of all the mother has suffered for the child, the child in return has to obey to her if he or she wants to have a great future.

We also have to bear in mind that the Senegalese society is composed of 90% Muslims and 10% Catholics. This fact makes polygamy a reality for rich and poor people. Polygamy always leads to a competition between brothers and sisters who do not have the same mother. The rivalry between them will be more or less important and perceptible depending on their mothers' relationship.

Inversely, as in every normal society, children are the pride of their parents – especially their mothers. The success of her child is of the mother and father, but the child's failure to succeed will be the mother's alone. The invoked reasons will be her failure to raise her child in the right way, in

accordance with Senegalese values of **Jom** (dignity) and **Foula** (courage), or her failure to support her child's father. With this mix of cultural values and social class issues, it will surely be difficult for an emigrant to come back to his country of origin without having succeeded in his search for self-validation.

The desire to leave is very present in the linguistic system, which includes sayings that glorify travel or simply migrants or migration. For example, among the Haalpulhar of the Senegalese river Valley, it's common to hear 'The Haalpulhar know where they were born but not where they will be buried' or 'If you have a son, let him go. One day he will come back either with money or knowledge'. On the other hand, we have the Wolof people who often say 'He who does not travel will never know where it is best to live' and 'Dignity makes people travel but courage make them come back'.

It is known that individuals who migrate experience multiple stresses that can impact their mental well-being, including the loss of cultural norms, religious customs, and social support systems, adjustment to a new culture and changes in identity and concept of self. Indeed, migration involves the loss of the familiar, including language (especially colloquial and dialect), attitudes, values, social structures and support networks. However, it is still evident that the same stresses can occur if the return in the country of origin is not the choice of the individual. If the individual loses the culture of his country of origin because of an effective integration in the host country, it may lead to difficulties regarding his or her reinsertion in the country of origin.

Culture: a blocking factor to social insertion both in the country of origin (acculturation) and in the host country

When individuals migrate they do not leave their beliefs or idioms of distress behind, no matter what the circumstances of their migration are. Their beliefs influence their idioms of distress, which influence how they express symptoms and their help-seeking behavior. This is showed by the diasporas from the different coun-

tries of immigration. Constituting groups of persons coming from the same country is in fact reassuring for the individuals and it is also a way for each of them to express themselves in a cultural way.

This culture's expression can be a positive thing or not according to the way people express themselves in a foreign and unknown country. However, most of the time it is seen as defiance by the natives of the host country and/or by the authorities and also as a refusal from the emigrants to integrate the social background they found on site. So this will to preserve the migrant's social identity can definitely be the factor that will make the authorities of the host countries want the migrant to go back home.

On the other hand, the total integration of the migrant and the acknowledgement of the host country culture can be a factor of rejection by both his compatriots in the host country and the ones in the country of origin. Whether be it the case of the successful emigrant or the one who failed, the rejection from the society will remain the same, even if it may be more important for the first one.

Returns

In the case of West Africa, the characteristics of the returning migrants and their social reinsertion have not been studied enough. Censuses conducted in different countries clarified to some extent the return flux and the migrants' profiles. However, these censuses are dressing some incomplete tables because the individuals are often identified on the basis of their residence places a few years before the census is done. The 2002 Senegalese census took their place of residence five years before as a basis, so the individuals who left and came back in a period of time less than these five years are not considered as returning migrants.

Theoretical Logic of the return approach

The return and its more or less rational nature are defined differently according to the different international migration theories. For example, the neo-classical economy theory and the one regarding work migration are

stating different point of views about migration and return of the migrant, although the theoretical framework (Push-Pull, please see below) sorts out a typology of the reasons for the migrant to come back in his country. The most ancient neo-classic approach, and also the most known, is based on the existing gap between the salary of the host country and the one of the country of origin, as the gain in the host country becomes much more important. According to this theory, the migrants become rational actors who decide to immigrate as a result of a calculation of the costs and benefits of their travel (Massey & Al, 1993). Migration is also seen as a way to maximize profits for the whole lifetime of an individual. This theory makes the return be considered as a failure because the goal of profit maximizing had not been reached. The failure is linked to the time the emigrant stays abroad and to the expected profit of the migration. However, if the differences between the salaries are eliminated, then the return won't be considered as a failure anymore.

More recently, the theory of the new economy of labor migration questions the conclusions of the neo-classic approach (Stark & Bloom, 1985). This theory enlightens the fact that a household, not a sole individual, makes decisions about migration. Migration becomes not only a way to maximize profits but also to minimize the risks of living in a restrictive economical context, diversifying the resources of the household. Based on this theory, the return becomes a logical result of the migration project, allowing emigrants to spare and to improve their competencies, having much more experience. Migration is also considered as a success since the emigrant reached his goals (Cassarino, 2004). King, in 2000, developed a simplified theoretical framework called 'Push Pull'. The 'pull' types are the ones inciting the migrant to come back in his home country because of a specific positive motivation, whereas the 'push' factors are at the origin of a migrant's decision to move from the host country. The return's causes are classified according to economic, social and family reasons (Table 1).

	PUSH	PULL
Economic Causes	Deterioration of the economic stability of the host country	<i>Development of the country of origin and rise of salaries</i>
Social Causes	Racism and difficulties related to the integration of the migrant (Adjustment Problems, Ammassari & Black)	<i>Homesickness, desire to have better living standards (enterprise creation, business, etc.)</i>
Family Causes	-	<i>Will to return to home country to get married, raise children in the country of origin and to reinforce strong family ties</i>
Political Causes	Forced deportation, indirect policies of the host countries regarding the migrant's return (work restrictions, family settlement, etc.)	<i>New policies facilitating the return (fiscal advantages, social assistance, social help)</i>
Moral reasons	-	<i>Chauvinism</i>

Table 1: Classification of the causes for return according to economic, social and family reasons.

Cassarino insists on the fact that behind the diversity of migration experiences, an essential element must be taken into account: the organization of the return. This requires a lot of time and is determined by personal or contextual circumstances in the country of origin or in the host country. Nonetheless, what we have to focus on is the capacity of the emigrant to gather tangible and intangible resources to ensure safe and good conditions of return. So are justified the Free Will and the Readiness concepts.

The Free Will concept tends to let the migrant have the choice to decide to return in the appropriate moment of the migration process. What is important to note here, is that the choice to return to his or her home country is not dictated by others or due to any circumstances. With this concept, the return is prepared and so is the migrant with all the financial resources and/or support he or she needs.

The Readiness concept reflects the idea according to which the migrant has acquired all the tangible and intangible resources he or she needs so that the whole process of his or her return can be done well. These resources will constitute the financial (e.g. savings and human education, experience and knowledge) capital of the migrants. Time and living conditions in host countries will surely be

decisive determinants of the return's success. In this respect, Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration policies, such as those implemented by IOM, can play a crucial role.¹

The first returns

In Senegal there's almost no database regarding the return migration statistics, and the existing databases give limited information about the subject. Among the Senegalese migrants who lived abroad for one year, 46% came back to Senegal whereas 54% never did. Concerning the countries where

1 Assisted Voluntary Return is an indispensable part of a comprehensive approach to migration management aiming at orderly and humane return and reintegration of migrants, who are unable or unwilling to remain in host countries, and wish to return voluntarily to their countries of origin. The AVRR Program promotes international dialogue and cooperation on migration management issues among host countries and countries of origin.

a. Effects of the AVRR from an Economic Point of View. This part of the return eases the social reinsertion both for the migrant and the state of Senegal, as far as he or she has enough income to develop activities or projects that will definitely raise the economy of the country. In fact, the migrant who decides to come back freely for a positive reason will then have no desire to leave his country for good.

b. Effects of the AVRR from a Social Point of View. Acceptation of the returning migrant by his or her family and his or her social environment will lead to: Improved migrant's self – esteem; Respect from his or her relatives; flourishing personality thanks to the positive experience.

PUSH	PULL
<p>Religion: Obviously, religion is a strong cultural factor. With the raise of Islamic terrorism, Senegalese migrants will have more and more difficulties to practice their religion. They're coming from a 90% Muslim society and have to integrate into a 90% Catholic society (difficult to find a job or to be accepted).</p>	<p><i>Will to get back to the religious background / favorable welcoming of the relatives because the migrant kept his cultural identity. Will to have better living conditions in accordance (religion won't be a cause of rejection anymore)</i></p>
<p>Language and dialect; language is also a marker of cultural difference. A different dialect raises linguistic questions, and also the probability that other cultural factors will be different.</p>	
<p>Ethnicity: Fact of belonging to a group having the same ideas, the same origins, the same story and culture and the same experiences and values Ethnicity = Vital attachment (GEERTZ) = Situational ethnicity (anthropology) = Rational behavior (sociology) Explicit or implicit cultural behavior may lead to the marginalization of the migrant.</p>	<p><i>Feeling of belonging towards the home country and pride to be Senegalese will make the migrant invest in Senegal. His return will be done in a voluntary way.</i></p>
<p>Racism: Economic and social changes make the migrants culturally different from the natives; idea of being responsible for the crisis in European countries.</p>	
<p>Cultural Identity and Community Culture has become a main element in the debate concerning ethnic minorities because it plays an important role in their identity. The Dynamic nature of culture is based on its capacity to link the story and the tradition of a group of individuals to the situation they live in the migration process. This situation may lead to a visible decline as result of a kind of discriminatory and exploiting modernization which make the migrants lose their identity</p>	<p><i>Homesickness and desire to live with the community (affiliation to a socio – cultural group).</i></p>
<p>State, nation, citizenship With globalization and the opening of frontiers, nation – states have to face new issues such as the one to define who the citizens of their countries are. In fact, globalization and general mobility due to migration make the national identity of the individuals disappear in favor of multiple identities. As citizenship becomes more and more universal, some notions such as 'nearly citizen' and 'transnational citizenship' appear.</p>	<p><i>Will of the migrant to go back in the home country to act for the development of the country and helping it benefit from the experience he or she gained abroad (higher human capital for the country = innovation). Being a 'transnational' citizen will also ease the return.</i></p>

Table 2: Cultural Push Pull Factors Influencing Return (Castles & Miller)

the returnees lived (figure 1), we can notice that a quarter of the emigrants come back from France (the favorite destination country of the Senegalese migrants in 2008). Returning migration from a European country other than France only represents 9% of the sample. The survival curve represents the proportion of the migrants who still lived abroad in 2008, taking into account the years passed since they left Senegal. The abscissa origin (année 0) represents the year the migrant left Senegal. In 2008 100% of the migrants lived effectively abroad.

Although we can notice that more and more migrants come back to Senegal as time goes out.

Conclusion

Migrants' contribution to the development of their countries of origin is not only monetary. Migrants' contribution also includes knowledge and skills transfer. Through the concept of 'brain circulation', qualified migrants can be encouraged to return to their countries of origin on a voluntary basis, temporarily, permanently or virtually, to transfer knowledge, skills and competencies. Emigrants must

be treated as partners and investors but not as a mere resource. Because of the importance of migrants' return in their country of origin, African governments have to think about how to open the frontiers and make all African natives circulate freely, whether they are from the west, the east, the south or the north. This will also help European and American countries balance migration's effects and improve the promotion of the migrants' return, with less risks of rejection in the host country.




Figure 1: Percentage of returning migrants according to the destination countries. MAFE Households Survey - Senegal 2008




Figure 2: The Returning Migrants Survival Curve – MAFE Survey Senegal 2008





Street Vendors

Senegal, 5 December 2013, Photo | Göran Höglund (Kartläsarn)

RETURNS AND REINTEGRATIONS IN THE SENEGALESE LABOUR MARKET

DATA FROM THE MAFE PROJECT - MIGRATIONS BETWEEN AFRICA AND EUROPE - SHOWS THAT RETURNS TO SENEGAL HAVE DECLINED MORE AND MORE SINCE THE MID-1970S. YET, THE MAJORITY OF MIGRANTS CONTINUE TO MAKE FREQUENT SHORT STAYS IN THEIR HOMELAND, AS A CYCLICAL MOVEMENT. THOSE WHO DO MANAGE TO REINTEGRATE PERMANENTLY CAN COUNT ON A SUFFICIENT HUMAN AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL THAT OFTEN ENABLES THEM TO SET UP AS INDEPENDENT WORKERS IN THE TRADE AND SERVICE SECTOR.

by Pape Sakho

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Introduction

The problematic nature of the return of southern country migrants is in the forefront of the news; it is about the relationships between Europe and Africa. This is in parallel to the management policies of the migratory flux through border entry controls put in place by European countries. It feeds political speeches and underlies the international debate raised both by the western and southern media.

Some studies support the idea of a

possible return in individual migratory projects (Ebin 1993; De Vreyer and al. 2008; Daum 1998; Robin and al. 2000). Others suggest a certain myth of a continuously postponed return which thus justifies the transnationalism theory (Bruzzone and al. 2006; Tall 2007; Sinatti 2009). In Senegal, little quantitative data is available and is very patchy (results of 2002 census), with only REMUAO surveys in 1993, DEMIS in 1997-1998 and « 1-2-3 » survey in 2001-2002. The migration sur-

vey between Africa and Europe, that the Migrations between Africa and Europe (MAFE) project completed in 2007-2008, addresses this need¹¹. This

1 ¹ The MAFE project is coordinated by INED (C. Beauchemin) and is formed, additionally by the Université catholique de Louvain (B. Schoumaker), Maastricht University (V. Mazzucato), the Université Cheikh Anta Diop (P. Sakho), the Université de Kinshasa (J. Mangalu), the University of Ghana (P. Quartey), the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (P. Baizan), the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (A. González-Ferrer), the Forum Internazio-



was the last major survey carried out in the region of Dakar. Data was collected over a long period (1975-2008) and used to trace the migration trajectories and identify major trends, characteristics and determinants of current Senegalese migration.

The purpose of this contribution is to provide an analysis of some trends of the returns derived from the results of this survey and some elements of public policies set up both in Senegal and in Europe. It is based on unpublished working papers of a team of analysts who investigated the nature of the phenomenon and its (Sakho P., et al. on 2013) economic effects (Eleonora C., et al. on 2013).

Some tendencies from the MAFE data

The analysis presents the data taken from household and biographic surveys on the characteristics of the return movements of Senegalese migrants between Senegal and three European countries (France, Spain and Italy), and their reintegration into the Senegalese labour market.


- **The characteristics of the returning movements**

Returns declining since the mid-1970's

The proportion of migrants coming back to Senegal from all destinations during the first decade after their departure has declined by half. It has gone from 75% in the mid-1970s to around 40% during the first half of the 2000 years. However, this decline is more visible in the migrants returning from Europe within the ten years after their first departure. Their proportion has declined from 54% in the mid-1970s to 20% in the first decade of the 2000 years, that is to say 1 migrant out of 5. A trend that is not confirmed

nale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull'Immigrazione (E. Castagnone), and the University of Sussex (R. Black). The MAFE project received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement 217206. The MAFE-Senegal survey was conducted with the financial support of INED, the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (France), the Région Ile de France and the FSP programme 'International Migrations, territorial reorganizations and development of the countries of the South'. For more details, see: <http://www.mafeproject.com/>

FIGURE 1: Proportion of migrants returning to their home country during the first decade of their departure from Senegal (Kaplan MEIER Estimates) considering their destination and period (1975-2007)



Source Household surveys, MAFE 2008

Population: The sample includes the migrants (Households' chiefs, their spouses and children having left Senegal at the age of 18 or more). It also includes the migrants who left before 1975.

among Senegalese returnees from non European countries (cf fig 1).


The intentions of stay duration before a possible return

From the mid-1970s to 2008, approximately a quarter (24.5%) of the migrants who left for France, Italy or Spain intended to return in the first decade following their first arrival in Europe. Nevertheless, their proportion has progressively declined in half to stabilise at around 20% during the last decade of the 20th century.

Frequency of stays in their country

On one hand, 1 migrant out of 6 (14-15%), whatever the place where they have resided (including before 1975) has made a long stay (for at least a year) before their last departure for migration. On the other hand, since the mid-1970s, the trend is declining (from 16.5% to 11%). It is true that during the 2000 years, the proportion of stays from Europe is 10% (Cf. Table 1). The overall decline in returns over

FIGURE 2: Proportion of the migrants intending to stay less than 10 years after their first arrival in France, Italy or Spain considering the period of their first arrival (1975-2007)



Source: biographic survey, MAFE, 2008

Population: the sample includes the first long stay in a destination country of all the migrants living in a MAFE country or back to Senegal aged 18 or more or after 1975.

Interpretation : the individuals intending to stay definitely are included in the category « more than 10 years »

a year might suggest that the Senegalese migrant returns less; in other words, more and more such migrants tend to stay, especially in Europe.

Among the migrants living in a European country during the investigation, since the middle of 1975, approximately 2/3 have made at least

one stay in their homeland (65.8%), mainly for visits lasting less than a year (Cf. Table 1).

During the last five years, more than half of them have made at least one visit to their country. The global tendency is that the biggest proportion makes short stays in their country (Cf. Table 2).

TABLE 1: Proportion of individuals living outside Senegal, having migrated at least once and made a return that lasted at least a year before their last departure

Place of present day residence	Last departure period				N
	1975-1990	1990-1999	2000-2007	1975-2007	
Europe	16.1	17.7	10.0	14.4	586
Africa (except Senegal)	32.2	10.0	13.9	15.4	118
others	6.2	12.8	15.6	14.0	103
All	16.5	16.1	11.0	13.4	807

Source: household surveys, MAFE, 2008
Population: the sample includes the migrants (household chiefs, their spouses and children) who left at the age of 18 now living abroad. It also includes those who left before 1975.

TABLE 2: Proportion of individuals living in France, Italy and Spain at least have done a long back (one year) or visit (return of less than one Year) Kaplan Meier Estimates) by country of residence ...

A) ... since their first arrival in Europe

Place of present day residence	% return			N
	Long	Visit	short or long	
France	7.9	73.2	74.0	186
Italy	6.3	61.3	62.7	203
Spain	2.9	51.9	52.6	199
<i>France, Italy, Spain</i>	6.1	63.8	65.8	588

B) ... during the five years after their first arrival

France	2.5	51.1	52.1	186
Italy	3.8	48.5	51.4	203
Spain	2.4	59.7	61.2	199
<i>France, Italy, Spain</i>	2.9	51.9	53.5	588

Source: biographic survey, MAFE, 2008.
Population: the sample includes the migrants who left Senegal at the age of 18 or after 1975, still living in France, Italy or Spain.

TABLE 3 : Proportion of individuals living in France, Italy or Spain having at least made a long or short return in the 5 years following their first arrival(Kaplan Meier estimates) considering the period and the residence rythm.

Place of present day residence	% returns (long or short)			
	1975-1990	1990-1999	2000-2007	1975-2007
France	47.3	58.8	51.1	52.1
	56	57	73	186
Italy	59.0	52.7	33.2	51.4
	33	77	93	203
Spain	(82.7)	68.8	51.0	61.2
	19	74	106	199
<i>France, Italy, Spain</i>	53.3	58.8	48.2	53.5
	108	208	272	588

Between 1975 and 2007, more than half (53.5%) of migrants living in the time of the survey, in whichever of the three European countries made at least one return to Senegal in the first 5 years of their arrival. Overall, after a peak observed during the 1990s, all returns have declined over the 2000s. However, from one country to another there are some remarkable differences. In France, a traditional destination country, as well as in Spain, a new destination one, returns concerned 1 out of 2 migrant in the 2000s. Conversely in Italy, the decline is not only regular, but it is also the strongest: only one third of migrants is returning. (cf. Table 3).

Table 3

All in all, if the returns from Europe have declined more and more since the mid-1970s, it remains constant that the majority of migrants keep making frequent short stays in their homeland. The fact that in the three surveyed countries, more or less 1 migrant out of 2 (51.9%) came back to Senegal for a visit strengthens the idea of a cyclical Senegalese migrants' movement.


• The reintegration into the labour market

A priori, the migrants who return are expected to be back with a capital gain, whether it is in terms of human or economic resources. They are also expected to live in better conditions compared with those who were not migrants. The returnees' weak occupational status are as numerous the first year of return as at the moment of migration departure (39% versus 34.5%). The tendency is that they remain active in the same occupations (43.7%) (Cf. Figure 3).

Comparatively to non-migrants, returnees are proportionally less present in the activities of weak level pro-




FIGURE 3 : Occupational status of returnees from Europe at four points in time in their migratory life and of non migrants at 2008 (%).



Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain
 Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain (Cfr. Table 1); weighted data
 Interpretation: Distribution of returnees by occupational status at four points in time and of non migrants.

FIGURE 4. Employment sector (working population) of returnees from Europe at four points in time in their migratory life and of non migrants at 2008 (%)



Source: MAFE-Senegal biographic survey in Senegal, France, Italy and Spain
 Population: Current migrants in France, Italy and Spain (cfr. Table 1); weighted data
 Interpretation: Distribution of returnees by employment sector at four points in time and of non migrants.

professional qualifications (43.7% versus 51.9%) but twice more present in those of higher professional qualifications (20.6% versus 10.2%), suffer less from joblessness (3.3% versus 5.3%) and less inactivity (16.3% versus 28.9%) than the non-migrants.

Considering the results, 1/3 of the returnees were working in trade activi-

ties and services before they left Senegal; at the moment of this survey they represent 60.3%. (Cf. Figure 4).

When they leave for Europe 59.4% are contractual workers, while when they come back 62% are independent workers. This would be the result of the financial capital gathered by the migrant during his/her reintegration

and confirmed by the type of job he/she is doing once back.

Discussion

Making a link between the different data of the history of migration, it appears that returns have lessened because of the strengthening of border controls and the hardening of entry and stay conditions (Tall & Tandian 2010, Beauchemin & Lessault 2009).

The MAFE results confirms the idea according to which Senegalese communities' have developed a new return attitude (Wolof in Italy), (Toucouleur and Soninke from the river Senegal valley in France), as developed in some recent socio-anthropologic studies (Sinatti 2009; Sarr 2010; Daum 1998; Fall and al. 2007). Returns would be continuously postponed because the living conditions in the European countries are more and more difficult to allow the achievement of an economic success that is a condition of a socially successful return that matches the familial obligations. According to those authors, the migrant, in order to sustain the deep link with their origins, has developed new relationships in his/her country through investments and circulation.

Comparative to non-migrants interviewed at the same moment, (51.9%), returnees tend to consider migrations as an added value, in terms of availability of a financial and social capital obtained thanks to their migratory experience. At the same time, the already high percentage of returnees in the trade and services sector before migrating (49.1%) from Senegal, and during their migration in Europe could motivate traders to set up in Senegal again.

We should also notice the heavy influence of the agricultural sector whose weakness would be linked to the place of investigation - its sample was drawn from the region of Dakar, a region that is 98% urbanized. Considering the importance of the peri-urban and urban agricultural sub-sector in our national economy and the opportunities this presents, the percentage of returnees is nevertheless weak there (0.3%).



Conclusion

These few results show two major recent trends regarding returns of Senegalese migrants. On the one hand, if the Senegalese migrants return less for longer stays they tend increasingly to multiply short visits. On the other hand, returned migrants seem much more to ensure their reintegration by investing financial capital mobilized mainly in the service sector and trade, their main activities before starting migration.

Far from the investigation myth of Europe, the MAFE results show that in weak proportions, certainly accentuated by the setting up of institutional constraints and the economic crisis in the European countries, the Senegalese migrants tend to return to their homelands. In the MAFE results we can notice some changes in the migrants' behaviour that privileges their movement as envisaged in the transnationalism theory. Furthermore, it appears clearly that their integration takes place in the preferred traditional sectors of Senegalese people (trade and services).

If migration constitutes an added value, it is to be found in the accumulated financial capital. What to say about the initiated public policies?

For a few years, circular migration policy is following the migratory movement. Since 2006, Senegal has concluded some partnerships with France, Italy and Spain within the framework of concerted management actions through legal migration so as to launch some mechanisms related to the movement and the return of migrants, such as the circular migration programs of short stays. These agreements more often than not, not only prevent a proper development of the migratory project but also do not allow for the accumulation of consistent financial resources. This could possibly explain their mitigated results. Moreover, their management comes up with both a problem of sovereignty, as the terms of reference are elaborated by the destination countries, and governance, as it is granted to the department of youth to the detriment of the department of labour, responsible for the expertise.

The battle for the setting up of more adequate policies is to know how the migratory logics, which is expected to drive the migrant at the beginning of his/her migratory project or as viewed by his/her native community, can also be a benefit for the country's development.

What are the returnee's main aspirations? What attractive answers should he/she be proposed? Afterwards, how to match the returnee's aspirations to the national policies' orientations in terms of migration and development? (Flahaux, Mezger and Sakho 2011)

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Soumbédioune Boats

Dakar, Senegal, 30 January 2011, Photo | Jeff Attaway

THE POLICY FALLACY OF PROMOTING RETURN MIGRATION AMONG SENEGALESE TRANSNATIONALS

THE THINKING THAT INFORMS RETURN MIGRATION POLICY IS BASED ON THE FLAWED ASSUMPTION THAT RETURNEES WILL NEVER MOVE AGAIN. PROGRAMMES DESTINED TO PREVENT SENEGALESE FROM CIRCULATING FAIL TO GRASP BEHAVIOURAL DETERMINANTS AND ASPIRATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY. INDEED, SENEGALESE MIGRANTS ARE OFTEN RELUCTANT TO REUNIFY WITH THEIR FAMILY IN FRANCE, SPAIN OR ITALY. RATHER, THEY PREFER TO “MAINTAIN TRANSNATIONAL LIVES”.

by Alpha Diedhiou

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Introduction

While some recent international initiatives to curb migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe appear to hold some promise, especially in terms of their early achievements, bilateral migration policies have generally focused on security and the promotion of return migration. The latter policy choice, return migration, seems to be driven by the need for European states to respond

promptly to the heightened concerns of their internal constituencies about mass immigration. As a reactionary policy framework, it is unsurprising that some of its instruments are not based on sound analytical work and a deep understanding of the issues it attempts to resolve.

This paper sets out to test the policy assumptions that underpin the pro-

motion of return migration. It also shows that there are three orders of return among Senegalese migrants: transitions, permanent return, and circulation. Understanding the fluidity between these three orders of return can help cast light on the importance of mobility among young Senegalese migrants. The paper places the current thrust among host countries to promote return migration policies

within the context of growing northern public pressures on various governments to stem immigration flows.

Orders of return among Senegalese migrants

Although a returning migrant can be defined as a person returning to their country of birth after having lived abroad (whether for a short or long period) and who intends to remain in their home country for at least a year, the policy intentions of return migration¹ championed by many European states envision a longer stay at home. If returning migrants do not remain at home for longer than the intended period, the idea is that they must not return to the previous destination. Getting migrants to leave the host country and never to return is at the heart of most return migration policies. In the most lenient scenarios migrants are expected to return only under specific circumstances, such as the receipt of temporary work visas. However, the return migration policies under consideration here are those that go as far as to support home country retention programmes, also presented in terms of long-term development support.

The retention programmes that intend to keep migrants in home countries for longer periods than a year appear to misunderstand the fluidity of migration processes in settings such as Senegal. Research into return migration decisions among the Senegalese migrant community has highlighted a specific moral philosophy that emphasises the economic and social benefits of return (Diedhiou 2011). I shall return to this pattern of thought about migration among young Senegalese.

1 The return migration policies referred to in this paper pertain to a range of policy initiatives introduced by various European states to encourage voluntary return or repatriation. They are generally couched in a language that emphasises mutual benefits for host and countries of origin. In the countries of origin, these initiatives have sought to foster local and national development based on the assumption that underdevelopment is the principal driver of migration from poor countries to Europe. The *Pay to Go* policy initiative in France and the *Alien and Migration Policy* in Spain are two examples of wider approaches with two main components: a) restrictive and control-oriented measures that use extraterritorial migration control instruments such as maritime patrols in high seas and b) preventive measures that seek to address what is assumed to be the root causes of permanent migration, namely underdevelopment.

Based on a closer examination of this moral philosophy, three forms of return can be isolated: first order return or transitions; second order or permanent return; and third order or circulation.

First order return or transitions occur when migrants take the decision to return home for short periods of time, typically between six months and a year. These are often occasioned by family bereavement, a need to set up a small business in person, or to prepare for further migration to a different destination. While bereavements are generally unprepared and the migrant often returns to the first destination, those who return to set up a small business or to move on to another destination are generally well prepared. For the latter, moving to another destination is often informed by experiences and knowledge of job opportunities, mostly changing labour market dynamics, in the first and second destination. Forced/constrained return such as repatriation can also push migrants to consider retention programmes as a transition, but rarely as a long-term solution.

Second order or permanent return affects migrants of all ages, socio-economic conditions in destination countries, and education levels. However, as an OECD study shows, return rates are higher among young migrants, often in the form of transitions to further migration, and retirees (OECD 2008). The study also found that the return rate is higher at the two ends of the education spectrum. Yet in the case of Senegal, systematic observation shows that permanent return mostly affects retirees, the highly skilled/educated, and migrants aged 40 or plus. Typically, highly educated/skilled migrants often return home to find work, retirees generally go back to manage previous investments, and middle-aged migrants who have lived abroad for long periods and who have saved and invested in some form of business also consider return. In all three cases, the decision to return is often pressed by family considerations (Tiemoko 2003), alongside the afore-mentioned philosophy among many Senegalese migrants, that it is most cost-effective to enjoy the fruits

of one's labour at home. For many of these permanent returnees, the achievement of permanent residency or even naturalisation allows for greater mobility. As such, they tend to split their time between the home country and destination places where they have lived. In this sense, even some of these so-called permanent returnees tend to keep mobile. The ones who tend to lose their mobility are those who have lived in destination countries in irregular conditions. Incidentally, the probability of returning home tends to be lower among this group (MAFE Project Briefing 2013c), although they are the main target of return migration policies.

Third order return or circulation can involve first and second order returnees. Circulation is not necessarily the preserve of those with the relevant documentation to undertake international travel without major restrictions. While second order returnees have the financial resources and social capital to circulate more freely, previously undocumented first order returnees do find a way to circulate. This is illustrated with the ever-changing migration routes between Senegal and southern Europe. Even departure points have moved from Saint Louis in the north of the country to the central areas and to the southern province of Casamance. Despite the establishment of joint border patrols between Senegal and some southern European states, migrants do still find a way of reaching European shores. At the time of writing, about 200 undocumented migrants from sub-Saharan Africa were reported to have reached the Spanish mainland from Morocco on 28 February 2014, emphasising the resilience of migratory flows to Europe despite restrictive measures (Belga News Agency 2014). The introduction of limited work visas for Senegalese migrants by countries such as Spain in 2007 reflects some form of unofficial acknowledgement that circulation is almost inevitable, and that the only viable way of managing immigration is to attempt to get a grip on numbers.

Problems with issue definition

Policy is always devised for a purpose and it is always driven by some

underlying political motive. In the case of return migration policy, the purpose is to stem the flows of immigration that have intensified in the last decade or so. The problematic, however, is that migration is defined by the exponents of return migration in terms of the perceived social and security problems it entails in Europe. Immigration has become a serious political issue in the wake of not only overstretched social services, but also of increasing threats from what is commonly referred to as 'home-grown radical Islamism'. In this regard, the promotion of return migration becomes a central element in immigration control policies, which are also regarded in some quarters as pivotal in attempts to curtail internal terrorism. In countries that have experienced terror attacks on home soil, such as the United Kingdom², immigration control has become a counter-terrorism instrument because most of the perpetrators of the 7th July 2005 London bombings belong to immigrant communities. To some extent, the promotion of return migration policy has therefore to be placed within the premise of such overarching security concerns.

By associating immigration with growing international insecurity, the policy narratives that are built around return migration turn the issue into a need to avert potential national security crises. In other words, return migration is perceived as a due response to a national crisis of insecurity. The crisis narratives pertaining to security issues, namely the threat from home-grown terrorism and overloaded social services, may be justified to some extent but they tend to construct a reductionist view of migration. Internally-initiated acts of terrorism cannot just be reduced to the presence of a large immigrant community, and promoting return migration will not address the security threats from internal terrorism. Fusing mass immigration with national and international insecurity is reminiscent

² Even though sweeping generalisations are not in order here, associating mass immigration with national insecurity is increasingly becoming common among some mainstream political parties across Europe, a practice that was previously regarded as the preserve of far-right groups.

of the problematisation of refugees in the 1980s, a process that led to the proliferation of similar containment policies which are at the root of contemporary dilemmas about internally displaced persons.

In essence, return migration policies attempt to address the issue of intensified migration whilst failing to capture the quintessence of the phenomenon. Assuming that migrants who return home will remain there and never move again is to misunderstand the capacity of humans to circulate, especially when mobility is central to people's trading aspirations and integration into global processes. People are always on the move for various reasons and the purity of place of provenance and belonging is left to the romantic imaginings of people nostalgic of an era long gone by. Beauchemin et al. (2013) provide a good insight into processes of migration among the Senegalese transnationals, noting that the Senegalese migrants are reluctant to reunify with their family in France, Spain or Italy. They prefer to "maintain transnational lives, made of comings and goings, and based on a multi-sited distribution of family members" (Beauchemin et al. 2013: 3).

The untested policy assumptions

Responding to high immigration flows at a time of socio-economic malaise and increasing public pressure in Europe seems common sense. However, elaborating the right policies – ones which substantially address some of the root causes of mass immigration – was always going to be a challenge for host country governments. In terms of policy formulation, problem/issue definition constitutes a first step towards mapping out appropriate responses. In this area, mass migration from countries of sub-Saharan Africa to Europe is systematically attributed to extreme poverty and/or political violence. While these two factors play an important role in migration decisions among sub-Saharan African youths (Gonzalez-Ferrer et al. 2013), in countries such as Senegal international migration is not necessarily a response to extreme poverty. Even when youths from the poorest segments of society have taken the de-

cision to migrate to find work in European countries it is rarely with the view to remaining indefinitely away from their families (Sinatti 2009).

It is true that the most recent flows of emigration among young Senegalese mostly concern undocumented migrants. This is in line with the findings of research carried out by the Migrations between Africa and Europe Project (MAFE). The findings show that the new wave of African migrants is "more likely to be less educated and undocumented" (MAFE Project Briefing 2013b: 2). The lack of adequate financial resources and strong social networks in destination countries mean that they have to resort to a form of travel which was rarely seen until now. This is illustrated by images of young Africans in makeshift boats attempting to cross seas to reach southern European shores. Surprisingly enough, many of the young Senegalese who take such risks to enter Europe do not leave home with the intention to never return. In general, this is done with the view to finding work, saving as much money as possible, and setting up small businesses they can live on, once back home. This is captured by Gonzalez-Ferrer et al. (2013).

The short- to medium-term perspective adopted by these youths is rooted in a form of realism they are seldom credited for. While return migration policies often assume that Senegalese (or for that matter, African) migrants seek to remain in destination countries forever or for very long periods, the new wave of migrants are well aware of the international political and economic conjunctures. They are also pragmatic about the constraints placed on the timeframe of their stay in destination countries by institutional responses to immigration. Another research work by MAFE buttresses this argument. It points out that this wave of migrants is likely to spend short- to medium-term periods during which they generate "sufficient money to use productively back home, without establishing the kinds of ties that in some cases discourage return" (MAFE Project Briefing 2013c: 7). The aforementioned study by MAFE also supports the argument



about timeframes. It even argues that “policies to promote return migration could take into account the time period – 3-to-10 years – within which return is more likely to occur” (MAFE Project Briefing 2013c: 6).

This short- to medium-term vision of emigration among undocumented Senegalese migrants of the last generation does not seem to be in line with responses developed by a few European governments to address immigration flows. Since the surge of this form of irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, a number of European countries have promoted return migration policies in conjunction with governments of migrant-sending countries. Congruent with the thinking that mass migration from Africa to Europe is underpinned by poor life conditions, inexistent job opportunities for young people, and a desire among migrants to stay indefinitely or for very long periods, return migration policies have sought to address such drivers by creating conditions of retention in the home country. For the exponents of return migration, encouraging and supporting governments of migrant-sending countries to create employment opportunities is enough to stem the flow of migrants to Europe. In the case of Senegal, much emphasis was placed on a programme to encourage young people to return to agriculture instead of migrating. The return to agriculture (REVA: French acronym) programme has been chosen here because it epitomises the type of programmes, championed by both host and countries of origin, which are focused on addressing underdevelopment as a key driver of migration from Africa to Europe.

It was based on the assumption that it is rural youths who make up the bulk of undocumented migrants. It was also premised on a thrust by the government that left power in April 2012 to promote agriculture as a developmental pillar in the country. Despite attempts by the incumbent government to repackage the initiative, the programme remains unattractive to young people, by and large. REVA was rejected outright by youths who had been repatriated from Spain between 2006 and 2007 (Ba 2007). How-

ever, the Spanish government continued to support the programme with aid pledges of at least €20m in 2006, which has more than doubled to €50m in 2013.

The REVA programme faced many challenges from inception. Firstly, a programme of agriculture development that is destined for young people cannot succeed when the wider agricultural sector is confronted with difficulties pertaining to persistent drought and flooding. Between 2006 and 2011, the primary sector only contributed to 13.8% of GDP, compared to 20.7% for the secondary sector and 46.4% for the tertiary sector (IMF 2013). Secondly, Senegal has failed to diversify its agricultural exports over the years, with groundnut products remaining the main agricultural export earners. In addition, available resources were too insufficient to support any form of industrial transformation of groundnuts, into biodiesel for instance. Although the REVA programme has evolved to become an instrument for promoting agricultural diversification, it continues to be too under-resourced to substantially address the root causes of youth unemployment. The focus on employment generation and the promotion of national development through agriculture are based on the assumption that underdevelopment is the main driver of migration among Senegalese youths. However, MAFE research shows that “more development does not translate into less migration to Europe” (MAFE Project Briefing 2013b: 4).

This way of devising policy based on false assumptions is reminiscent of the earlier narrow conceptualisations of underdevelopment as the absence of economic growth, and poverty as a lack of adequate income. Also, by providing aid to support the retention and employment programmes of a migrant-sending government, the Spanish authorities have merely reinforced much criticised aid relations of the past - a practice that has seen most aid resources wasted in unviable programmes or projects. This is generally due to the lack of understanding of programme context, which could have been resolved with research and

systematic *ex ante* programme appraisal.

Equally problematic and erroneous is the assumption that there are incentive structures which could be put in place to retain young Senegalese at home once they have been repatriated, or simply encouraged to return home voluntarily. Such thinking misunderstands and completely fails to capture the conceptual complexity and dynamism of migration among Senegalese. Conversations with Senegalese migrants over the past decade or so (Diedhiou 2011) have helped cast light on an important element of their underlying migration philosophy. As mentioned earlier, the moral philosophy that underpins migration among many Senegalese youths holds that the fruits of their labour during migration are best enjoyed at home and are used to help lay solid foundations for future departures. In this respect, migration among Senegalese youths is not only driven by a search for better income. It is also a process that helps construct strong social and professional networks capable of responding to their entrepreneurial aspirations. As such, migration in the Senegalese context has to be situated within a geography of globalisation where the world is regarded as a space where people are able to circulate and trade (Diouf 2000).

Concluding remarks

Return migration policy is built on flawed assumptions that reduce migration to an effort to escape poverty and/or war. It dismisses the multiple other reasons that inform the decisions to migrate. It also underplays the importance of mobility by reifying concepts of home and abroad. In so doing, migrants are encouraged to return home with the creation of what is regarded as conditions for retention. Yet, mobility continues to characterise international migration flows, especially among Senegalese. Circulating to gain knowledge and develop strong social and business networks is at the centre of how many Senegalese migrants think of their place and role in contemporary global processes. Programmes destined to keep young Senegalese from circulating may therefore be addressing issues other

than some of the underlying motives for migration. High youth unemployment does play a role in decisions to migrate, but leaving the home country or returning indefinitely transcends the need to gain employment and generate revenue. Like many entrepreneurs, young Senegalese who migrate do so with the view to developing the social and financial capital necessary to sustain and grow a business.

Migration, for many Senegalese, represents one dimension of a broader entrepreneurial endeavour, the success of which depends on the capacity of the individual or family members to move. As the orders of return show, mobility is the means but also the end of the game. In this respect, the incentives imagined by the return migration paradigm do not go any way close to meeting the aspirations of many young Senegalese migrants. This failure is fundamentally linked to the way return migration policy defines migration and its root causes. By failing at the level of issue definition, generating in the process reductionist crisis narratives, and flawed policy responses, return migration policy shrinks the scope of policy interventions.

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Salt Boats, Pink lake

Niaga, Senegal, 30 July 2011, Photo | Jeff Attaway

THE PAISD: AN ADAPTIVE LEARNING PROCESS TO THE MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

JOINTLY CARRIED OUT BY FRANCE AND SENEGAL, THE PAISD PROMOTES MIGRANTS' ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND PRIVATE COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT IN THE HOME COUNTRY. ITS SECOND PHASE (PAISD II), COMMENCING IN JUNE 2014, IS PARTICULARLY PROMISING INsofar AS IT UNVEILS EXISTING SYNERGIES BETWEEN BUSINESS AND SOLIDARITY, PROMOTING A NEW AND POTENTIALLY SELF-SUSTAINABLE "DEVELOPMENT BY THE DIASPORA".

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The 'Migration and Development' nexus in Senegal

The 'Migration and Development nexus' is currently high on the agenda of both researchers and policy-makers and the consensus has been growing in recent years on the positive interaction between its two components. According such an interpretation, migration could, under certain conditions, trigger development. Nevertheless, the presence of a large amount of

data, competing theories and varying policy approaches makes it difficult to interpret and fully comprehend the multiple facets of the dynamics between migration and development.¹

¹ The relationship between "Migration" and "Development" is characterised by complex reciprocal feedback mechanisms. The intrinsic difficulty in capturing such a complexity has often engendered fragmented, un-

coordinated and ineffective policy responses that have failed to take into account all the dimensions of the nexus, being sometimes only inspired by an ill-concealed hope to curb irregular migration and get rid of undesired migrants. This is the rationale behind the enactment of the so-called 'development instead of migration policies' (de Haas 2007), the objective of which is to prevent further migration by addressing its root causes, i.e. underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment and lack of opportunities at home. The idea that triggering



Also troubling, is the fact that speculations about 'Migration and Development' are being challenged by the misuse, trivialization and overexposure of the phrase, with the *nexus* dangerously at risk of becoming a mere fad, buzzword or a-critical mantra pervading the development discourse.² Moreover, despite growing agreement on the potential for migration to contribute to development, consensus quickly fades with respect to how this might occur and to the most appropriate policy framework to harness the benefits of migration and maximize "developmental" spillover effects while minimizing potential negative repercussions.

If proceeding via trial and error is inevitable, Senegal has proved to be a suitable testing ground, having become a lively laboratory for piloting different policy-recipes in the 'Migration and Development' field. Senegalese proactivity in dealing with

development in sending countries could somehow contain migratory pressure to destination countries is however naïve and wishful thinking. Some studies (Zelinsky 1971; de Haas 2010) show indeed that a mild improvement in life conditions in sending countries plays more as a catalyst than as a restraint on migration flows in the short term. Migration thus cannot be isolated as an exogenous variable: rather it simultaneously causes and it is caused by development processes. Apart from the (failed) attempt to read the nexus in the sense that more development could curb migration, the 'Migration and Development nexus' could be read in the opposite way as well: in the sense that migration could reduce development (e.g. by generating conspicuous consumption, discouraging those left behind from working and causing brain-drain). Some of these arguments have been reversed over the years, dismantled or at least assessed in a less apocalyptic way by several theoretical contributions. (See for example Taylor 1999, Skeldon 2002, de Haas 2005, Grabel 2008). A more promising and palatable interpretation of the nexus has made inroads both into academia and into the field. More and more researchers and policy makers are indeed suggesting that migration could, under certain conditions, promote development (especially human development). The programmes and projects stemming from this last interpretation of the nexus are likely to be the most fruitful in the field, since they are not pursuing hidden agendas (such as using the 'Migration and Development' rhetoric in order to curb migration or to nurture perverse logics of clientelism, ideally being only inspired by a genuine desire to make migration work for development (and not development work for less migration!). This third way of interpreting the nexus is the one adopted in this article.

2 See for example Vammen I.M. and Mossin Brønden B., (2012).

the nexus depends on at least four factors: a deep-seated mobility tradition; an ingrained migration culture; the strong propensity of Senegalese migrants to establish a multitude of 'hometown' associations abroad and resilient trans-local networks; and an early mainstreaming of the 'Migration and Development' discourse at the national institutional level since the 1990s.

Senegal has always been characterised by strong migratory dynamics, being both a sending and destination country, at the intraregional and inter-regional level³. In Senegalese society, migration is considered one of the most effective means of upward social mobility, dramatically outpacing higher education (Riccio 2005 and Ludl 2008). If, in traditional Western-African imaginary, migrating was already conceived as a 'rite of passage', such benign social consideration has been further strengthened in recent years. 'Modou-Modous'⁴ are now celebrated in popular songs as contemporary heroes and are the preferred targets of 'gold-diggers'. Senegalese migration is organised through a social network system facilitating the reception and integration of new migrants in destination countries. Migration networks might be more or less institutionalised, based either on religious affiliation (e.g. the Murid 'dahiras') or on ethnic or geographical criteria ('hometown associations' *stricto sensu*). Such lively diaspora involvement abroad finds its basis in the spectacular activism of authorities at home. The Senegalese Government has been a forerunner in acknowledg-

3 Focusing on the Europe-Senegal migration corridor, the three main European destinations for Senegalese migrants are Italy, France and Spain. While Senegalese in France typically have higher education, only 10% of those who migrated to Italy and Spain are highly educated (Schoumaker et. al 2013). According to the World Bank (2011), inward remittance flows to Senegal expected in 2010 amounted to \$ 1 164 million. Remittances accounted for 12% of GDP in 2007 (Some 2009). Recent research by Orozco et.al. estimates (2010) that 81% of Senegalese migrants in Europe send money back home.

4 Riccio (2005) argues that Modou-Modou 'are the rural migrants who only know how to trade but nevertheless manage to earn enough money abroad and come back showing off new houses, clothes, big weddings and all the symbols of success'.

ing the importance of establishing a legal and institutional framework to maintain diaspora contacts in view of promoting development through migration. From the 1983 creation of a ministry responsible for coordinating the socio-economic reintegration of perspective returnees to the two 'Symposium des Sénégalais de l'Exterieur' (held in 1994 and 2001) and from the disputed REVA⁵ plan to the creation of a Ministère des Sénégalais de l'Exterieur (suppressed in 2012), the Senegalese Government has paid careful attention to the 'Migration and Development' nexus (although such attention has not always been coherent, conclusive or coupled with adequate resources).

For these reasons, Senegal has a well-developed tradition of projects, initiatives and funds dealing with migration matters. Such projects are run either by the government, donor countries (both at central and local levels) and international organizations, NGOs or directly by migrant associations. In this panoply of initiatives, the PAISD⁶ stands out as one of the most stimulating and long-lasting programmes. Jointly carried out by France and Senegal, the PAISD is an interesting case-study given the importance of the diplomatic and economic ties between the two implementing countries, the extensive and highly educated Senegalese diaspora in France and the PAISD's duration (its multiannual implementation timeframe represents an exception in a plethora of finite development aid projects).

The PAISD has undergone several changes during its various phases of implementation, diversifying its objectives over the years. Such an adaptive learning process along with the programme's far-reaching scope and innovative prospects makes the PAISD, notwithstanding some minor flaws, a successful experience in co-development practice. In this article, I will describe the evolution of the PAISD, how the programme works, its outputs and how it gradually shift-

5 Retour des Emigrés vers l'Agriculture.

6 Programme d'Appui aux Initiatives de Solidarité pour le Développement.

ed towards employing a more business-oriented approach to the 'Migration and Development' nexus.

The PAISD: evolution and outputs

Formerly known as 'Initiatives de Co-développement' (2005-2008), the PAISD I was implemented from 2009-2013 (with an endowment of nine million euros provided by France and an additional 0.75 million euros provided by Senegal). Mainly covering the "Région du fleuve"⁷ and the "region de Dakar"⁸, the PAISD I includes five components:

1. 'Accompagnement des projets d'investissement privé'

This component aims at supporting those migrants (through professional mentoring, training and follow-up) wishing to start business activities in Senegal. Migrants are helped to identify and develop their investment ideas through assistance in conducting feasibility studies. Apart from the preparatory studies, the PAISD also funds training and follow-up activities during the first year. Generally, only individual migrants apply to receive support within this component. One exception, however, was the support given to Niokolo Transport, a collective effort of several migrants whose positive outcome inspired the design of the PAISD II and its new 'private-sector-oriented approach' (see below). In total, 485 entrepreneurs have been assisted by the PAISD to date, while 1800 indirect jobs have been created. The majority of migrants supported under the first component have conducted their entrepreneurial projects in the Région de Dakar.

2. 'Mobilisation de l'expertise de la diaspora'

This component aims at mobilizing the highly-skilled diaspora for short-term missions in Senegal. Volunteer consultants transfer their specific knowledge and know-how. They are provided with a daily subsistence allowance and their travel expenses are covered by the programme. Experts from the diaspora willing to volunteer can register on the online

⁷ Especially as far as the third component is concerned (see below).

⁸ Especially as far as the first component is concerned (see below).

database 'www.senexpertise.gov.sn'. Approximately 800 highly skilled migrants have uploaded their CVs on senexpertise.org, while 62 expert missions have been conducted.

3. 'Appui au développement local des régions d'origine'

This component aims at co-funding infrastructure projects promoted by diaspora associations. Conceived as a way to multiply the impact of so-called 'collective remittances' (Goldring 2004), proposed infrastructure projects are financed up to 70% by the PAISD. The co-funding has a multiplier effect (every euro collected generates 2.3 euros of investment). On average, OSIM⁹ managed to autonomously gather 31,414 euros per project. Moreover, partial co-funding encourages migrant associations to look for additional funds via the mobilisation of other partners. From 2005-2012, 134 projects were funded, totalling more than 15.4 million euros (4.7 million euros directly collected by OSIM, 10.7 million euros provided by the PAISD). The outputs of the third component are impressive. In the educational sector, 46 projects were constructed. 271 classrooms and 19 libraries with annexed computer rooms were built for a total of 16,200 students. In the health sector, 42 structures were built, with a potential user base of 251,000 people. In a Sahel country like Senegal, water supply is crucial: 31 projects were completed in this sector serving 163,400 beneficiaries (including 19 water towers, 10 drillings and 8 dams for agricultural purposes). In addition, 189 km of drinking water distribution pipelines were laid, alongside the establishment of 11,500 house connections. As for the vocational training sector, three training centres were established, with a reception capacity of 550 students. The third component mainly covers the so-called « région du Fleuve » with activities conducted in the Région de Matam (Matam-Kanel) and the Région de Saint-Louis (Podor). Outside the Senegal River Valley area, infrastructure projects have also been implemented in the Région de Tambacounda (Bakel-Goudiry). It is noteworthy that, in order to reduce

⁹ Organisations de Solidarité Internationale issues de l'Immigration.

the costs of these projects, the PAISD is now uses building "templates" (i.e. for the 'typical' school or hospital) validated by state technical services in conformity with local legislation. Such templates allow for the identical reproduction of structures in different regions/villages. Utilizing this approach, it is possible to both save money (given that the architectural project remains the same) and to improve the technical quality of OSIM's interventions. Moreover, the existence of ready-made templates, allows OSIM to save time and to rapidly deliver tangible results in sending communities.

4. 'Volontariat de Solidarité pour le Développement'

This component primarily includes the implementation of cultural and social programmes in order to link second-generation migrants to their parents' homelands. As of 2012, 15 young people had volunteered to participate in these programmes, with approximately 100 others registered in the database.

5. 'Lutte contre la fracture numérique'

The fifth component of the PAISD I aims to eliminate the digital divide by exposing the most peripheral region of Senegal to information and communication technologies (ICT) through the construction of modern multimedia centres. Although not targeting migrants directly, the fifth component will enable those 'left behind' by the migration process to communicate more easily with relatives abroad (as ICT centres will be built in major sending regions).

In November 2013, the PAISD II was renewed, with a budget of two million euros, covering the period from 2013-2016. The new phase will be entirely operational by the second semester of 2014, introducing major modifications to the architecture of the programme.

The PAISD II will merge the second and fourth components of PAISD I into a new component solely devoted to human resources. The first component of PAISD I will be divided: perspective entrepreneurs will still be coached on start-up enterprises,



while groups of migrants (either formally affiliated to an association or informally grouped) will also be supported in private collective investments. The third component of PAISD I (i.e. co-funding of infrastructure development projects) will be expanded to include multi-village projects. An additional and innovative component will deal with partnerships and dissemination of best practices.

Encouraging prospects toward a more business-oriented model

The main innovation of the PAISD II, commencing in June 2014, is a strong interest in the development of the private sector and the mainstreaming of a new business-oriented approach targeting private collective investments. Once the basic needs of sending communities have been fulfilled, in terms of housing, health, education, water supply and sanitation, other needs progressively but invariably arise. In particular, migrants from these communities have become more aware of the fact that remittances (both at the individual and collective level) are dependent upon their continuous stay abroad, i.e. that remittances are not self-sustainable in the long-term if merely used for consumption rather than investment. After having contributed to the creation of a viable, conducive environment in sending regions through actions promoted under the framework of the third component ('Appui au développement local des régions d'origine') of PAISD I, migrants are increasingly confident about their skills to manage collective remittances.

Moreover, their experience abroad has influenced their visions: migrants feel that self-sustainable development could and should be the result of private investment and the creation of local employment opportunities, as a means of ending dependency on foreign aid. This awareness does not uniquely concern individual migrant entrepreneurs, but also groups of migrants eager to realise private collective investments.

A ground-breaking model for these new developments has been the experience of 'Niokolo Transport', an enterprise supported by PAISD I within

the framework of the first component. Different from other projects, Niokolo does not involve individual savings but rather the collective resources of a migrant association: the APDK¹⁰. After participating in traditional development aid interventions, the APDK attempted to identify new ways to assist local communities back home without resorting to dependency on gifts. An assessment of local needs revealed the inefficient transport system presented a major problem in the region. The absence of a viable transportation network between Kedougou and Dakar or between Kedougou and dispersed villages hindered local economic and social development. Thus, in abandoning the charitable approach, the APDK decided to establish a 'société anonyme' (i.e. a public limited company). Several members of the APDK have purchased shares of this new business entity and approximately 3500 shares have been sold to date. In total, the company includes 300 shareholders and has created jobs for 76 people. The company transports approximately 80,000 passengers per year. New regular bus lines are currently being studied as are plans for expansion to other regions and countries.

The positive experience of Niokolo Transport prompted the PAISD to promote a new 'private-sector-oriented' approach. Such an approach is meant to couple the social dimension of public collective investments realised within the framework of the third component ('Appui au développement local des régions d'origine') with an economic dimension, the idea being that these two dimensions should complement each other (since dividends stemming from private-sector-oriented activities could be reinvested in social enterprises or used for social purposes). This is in line with the general evolution of the PAISD which plans to encourage other migrant associations to follow the example of APDK and transform themselves into investment companies. Such transformation would also have a non-negligible corollary: the investment risk will be disbursed among several shareholders mean-

¹⁰ Association pour le Développement de Kédougou.

ing that, different from individual projects, each migrant would invest a portion of his/her money and therefore 'risk' a more limited sum of his/her earnings.

The constructive model of Niokolo Transport, alongside ongoing reflection within the programme and the encouraging results of a study¹¹ conducted by the AFD, led to the renewed first component in PAISD II: apart from funding feasibility studies, training and follow-up for singular migrant-entrepreneurs, the second phase of the programme will also fund private collective investments by migrant associations and groups of migrants.

Another interesting evolution of the PAISD is the idea to establish a 'business incubator' (pepinière d'entreprise) in the outskirts of Dakar, in collaboration with the region Île-de-France and the Dakar region. The pepinière aims to support business start-ups during their early stages of development and will provide a wide range of affordable business-related resources and services (e.g. shared, cheap office space and shared administrative services) to selected young firms. The costs of the services provided will gradually increase every year in order to stimulate the enterprise to become independent from the pepinière and to identify autonomous office space.

This activity, apart from highlighting the beneficial interplay of the PAISD with decentralised cooperation, supports the progressive movement towards the 'private-sector-oriented approach' which PAISD II intends to implement, targeting increasing economic opportunities, private productive investment and business development. The construction of the incubator is, however, on hold at the

¹¹ In order to develop this new potential component, the PAISD started a collaboration with AFD (Agence Française de Développement). The AFD conducted a scoping study aimed at identifying all the investment niches in the 'Région du fleuve' in order to help associations to choose the best business opportunities. The study was also in charge of finding out the most suitable legal status an association could use to initiate business activity and the available funding opportunities.

moment due to ongoing local government reform in Senegal and the overhauling of the competences of local authorities¹².

Best practices and lessons learned

The PAISD could be considered as an innovative approach to the 'Migration and Development nexus', providing for overall positive performance.

However, in order to appreciate the beneficial - though limited- effects of the programme, it is necessary to outline and discuss potential unrealistic expectations.

In particular, it is unrealistic to overestimate the impact of the PAISD at the macro-level. PAISD I had encouraging results at the micro-level in improving quality of life and related conditions of local households or, at best, villages. The PAISD did relatively well in helping small enterprises to bloom (even though the sustainability rate requires improvement) and supporting infrastructure projects promoted by migrant associations. However, in order for the PAISD to have an impact on the overall development of the country, the size of the programme, as well as its funding and geographic distribution, should be greatly enhanced. Nonetheless the renewed third component of the PAISD II is a first step in this direction.

The idea is to no longer intervene at the village level but at the departmental level instead, with projects involving several villages in order to exploit economies-of-scale while avoiding waste and duplication. This new approach will require new interlocutors: federations of associations should replace small OSIMs in order to develop larger infrastructure projects covering greater geographical areas. If this trend manages to prevail and gains the support of small hometown associations, the impact of the PAISD will be enhanced, producing wider and more systemic effects.

The PAISD should be praised for its holistic, multidimensional approach. The programme simultaneously deals with several aspects of the Migration and Development nexus, implicitly acknowledging that migration is a complex and multipronged phenomenon requiring an equally intricate and multifaceted policy response.

Another strength of the programme is its flexibility. Having been operational 2005, the PAISD has never stopped evolving in almost ten years of activity, continuing to redefine and review its contents and reshuffle its components to ensure its adaptability to changing conditions in the field. For example, the recent trend in the re-orientation of OSIM resources toward private collective investment responds to the perceived necessity to stimulate economic development in rural areas where basic needs have already been met.

Another sign of such flexibility is represented by the new component 'Capitalisation et Partenariat' enshrined in the forthcoming PAISD II. This component will, on the one hand, collect and disseminate best practices gathered during the programme and, on the other, help migrants and migrant associations in the search for additional partners (such as local authorities or private foundations) in order to provide access to technical expertise, mobilise further resources and raise funds for ambitious projects beyond the PAISD financial capacity.

The PAISD success also depends on the logic underpinning its action. Its interventions are characterised by a 'logique d'accompagnement' and not by a 'logique de substitution'. This means the PAISD only strengthens already existing activities, maximizing their chances of success without imposing exogenous 'magical formulas' from the outside to trigger development. The PAISD limits itself to supporting actions that would have taken place in any case, independent of the programme's intervention. Building on the existing reality, the PAISD offers its 'accompagnement' to create the best conditions for these initiatives to thrive. This is a successful strategy as it respects the 'grassroots' origin of existing initiatives, the content of

which is not imposed by remote policymakers. Instead, the PAISD rather promotes a 'participatory' approach, enhancing both the local ownership and the sustainability of the initiatives over the long term.

The PAISD is a multi-stakeholder partnership, coordinating the concerted efforts of different actors: individual migrants, migrant associations, Senegalese public technical administration, French 'collectivité locales', local construction firms and NGOs, cabinet d'experts and technical assistants. The involvement of different actors allows the programme to build on diverse experiences, perspectives and modus operandi towards the shared overarching goal of promoting development through migration. The transnational dimension of diaspora is taken into account in all aspects of the PAISD. Migrants are encouraged to make use of their 'translocal' social capital and their 'translocal' social networks and to exploit their familiarity with the cultural codes, language, legislative and institutional context of both sending and receiving communities.

Concerning ownership, another positive quality of the PAISD is that it has been conceived since the outset as a joint French-Senegalese initiative. Senegal is a real partner to the programme which increases the legitimacy of the initiative. A shared responsibility is ensured at all levels (from the funding to the composition of the "governing" and "monitoring" bodies, including the steering committees). The involvement of Senegalese authorities is crucial, particularly for interventions made in the framework of the third component since it is up to the Senegalese Government to ensure the maintenance of infrastructures and the deployment/payment of personnel working within them (e.g. teachers, doctors, nurses etc.).

Last, but not least, the PAISD is interesting with respect to its fertile cross-pollination with decentralised cooperation. Not only does the participation of local authorities multiply the sources of co-funding, encourage decentralisation processes and contributing to mainstreaming local de-

¹² The Reform, known as *Acte 3 de la décentralisation*, was launched on 19 March 2013 and will reshape the institutional architecture of Senegal as well as the competences and mutual relations between communes, department and regions.

velopment through concerted actions, but it also contributes to a deeper integration of migrants into the receiving communities.

Apart from these strengths, the PAISD also presents some weaknesses. For example, although inspired by an overarching strive towards coherence, its governing structure includes several bodies uniting at different levels (from ambassadors to civil servants to practitioners), with different responsibilities and meeting in multiple venues at various periodic intervals. This inevitably presents challenges with the risk of becoming too heavy, creating fragmentation instead of coherence.

Moreover, since the PAISD is based on bilateral agreements between France and Senegal, its scope is deliberately limited to people who have migrated to France and to migrant associations registered in France. Such limitation excludes transnational federations or associations whose potential involvement could increase the impact of the actions promoted (especially as far as the third component is concerned).

Lastly, the construction of collective infrastructures could, in theory, create a risk of moral hazard in the sense that migrants' activism in building infrastructure might diminish incentives for the government to provide services the state is entitled and required to deliver. However, in practice, it is difficult to associate a consequence of this nature to PAISD since, as explained above, the programme's logic is one of "accompagnement". Thus, even without PAISD support, migrants would in any case have organized "collective remittances" to build vital infrastructures back home.

Conclusions

Even though the PAISD success is partly due to inherent context-dependent variables (such as its multi-annual implementation timeframe, the trust established among stakeholders, the presence of a large and highly-skilled Senegalese diaspora in France, etc.), an analysis of the programme stimulates a reflection regarding conditions necessary for genuine, creative policy-making ef-

forts in the 'Migration and Development nexus'.

The PAISD has proved to be proactive in developing and supporting innovative intervention strategies inspired by the spontaneous diaspora practices in *statu nascendi*. In particular, if the promises of the new private-sector-oriented approach are kept, the PAISD II will present a single unique and flexible framework to respond to both social and economic challenges. Instead of conceiving the social and economic dimensions of development as irreconcilable (as a part of the outstanding development discourse continues to do), the PAISD dares to unveil existing synergies between business and solidarity, promoting – without forcing- a new and potentially self-sustainable "development by the diaspora" model capable of being replicated elsewhere with due adaptation.

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Playing kid in Senegal

Dakar, Senegal, 10 July 2006, Photo | Juan Falque

THE LOCAL-TO-LOCAL DIMENSION OF THE MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

GOOD PRACTICES FROM THE JOINT MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE IN SENEGAL SHOW THE IMPORTANCE OF LINKING CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES WITH LOCAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS. LOCAL AUTHORITIES WHO DEVELOP STRONG TIES WITH DIASPORA COMMUNITIES, ORIGINATING FROM THEIR AREA, CAN EFFECTIVELY DIRECT INVESTMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS BACK IN THE HOME COUNTRY.

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The Joint Migration and Development Initiative

In 2008, the European Commission and the United Nations launched a Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMIDI)¹ that reflects the acceptance of a strong nexus between migration and development (M&D). The

programme was built on the premises that it was important to generate a solid evidence base for better planning and management in this field, in order to know what works and why.

The good practices identified by the Joint Migration and Development Initiative showed the importance of efficiently linking civil society initiatives, such as the ones of diaspora groups with local development agendas in order to reach sustainability and de-

velopment impact. So far, the experimentation of small scale initiatives have had positive effects and contributed to change the degree of activism of local administrations in the field of migration and development. Unfortunately, their involvement remains, for the time being, largely underdeveloped and many obstacles exist, such as a lack of capacities and of efficient and effective coordination within local authorities' administration and with other stakeholders.

¹ The JMIDI was funded by the European Commission and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. In Senegal, the programme is implemented by International Organization for Migration (IOM) along with its partners UNDP, ILO, UNHCR, UNFPA and UNWOMEN. The second phase of the programme will run from 2013 to 2015.



Findings on local ownership

The findings of the JMDI show that the effectiveness of M&D activities largely depends on the identification and establishment of strategic partnerships between civil society organisations and governments at decentralised levels.

The most successful and sustainable M&D interventions identified by the JMDI are those with strong anchorage with the local governments in countries of origin and destination, in line with the essential local-to-local dimension of the migration and development nexus². When local authorities share a common vision with civil society partners, they develop a sense of ownership over projects that lead them to commit time, energy and resources, which effectively contribute to the success and sustainability of an M&D initiative.

This linkage is all the more important as the drivers and impact of migration are often most strongly felt at the local level, be it in terms of effects on the local labour market, the size and demographic of the local population, or the need for public service provisions. This is why provinces and local authorities are strategic levels in order to reinforce the involvement of governments, making consultations and agreement with sub-national levels of governments particularly important for the civil society.

However, in general terms, local governments have not received the same level of attention as other stakeholders, while their involvement and potential impact on the connections between migration and development is crucial.

Since December 2012, the JMDI started implementing activities designed to specifically target local authorities as well as civil society organisations that have a stake in local development.

² Local authorities are at the forefront in confronting the transformations and opportunities that migration brings about; the drivers and impact of migration are often most strongly felt at local level.

Local authorities' involvement in Senegal

Since the early 90s, Senegalese migration has undergone important changes especially, with the more systematic orientation flows towards Northern countries. According to the Department of Planning and Statistics (ANSD), 54 % of Senegalese migrants between 1999 and 2004 chose to settle in Europe (46%) and the USA (8%) against 44 % in Africa. France remains the first European country that Senegalese migrants call home. The new countries of choice for the Senegalese are now Spain, Italy and the United States of America.

According to the World Bank and the University of Sussex (Observatory ACP, 2010), Senegal listed 463 403 Senegalese migrants (or 4% of total population) in 2005. 46.2% of them resided in other sub-Saharan African countries. According to the same study, the main destinations for Senegalese migrants in 2005 were the Gambia (123 443, or 26.3% of the total stock of emigrants), France (90 551 or 19.5% of the total stock of migrants), Italy (70 783 15.3% of the total stock of migrants) and Mauritania (42,866 or 9.3% of total stock of migrants).

In terms of stock, key destinations within the African continent for Senegalese migrants, such as Ivory Coast and Gabon, are now in decline, while neighbouring countries, such as the Gambia, Mauritania and Mali receive about 40% of current African flows.

In Senegal, decentralisation entered a decisive phase in 1996 with the transfer, from the central State to local authorities, of nine areas of responsibilities. Local authorities³ acquired a range of management autonomy and members who compose them are elected by universal suffrage. Transferred domains fall into three categories: economic, cultural, health and social. However, the implementation of local policies in these areas of competence, of primary importance to the daily lives of citizens, and the degree of autonomy enshrined in the legal

³ Senegal has 14 administrative regions, which include departments and districts, communes and rural communities.

provisions are hampered by the lack of human and financial resources of local communities.

The importance of the competences transfer lies in the fact that it allows local officials to intervene in matters that directly affect the daily lives of people, and to be significantly involved in the pursuit of local development. It is therefore an empowerment policy for local stakeholders, who are now obliged to submit results at the time of evaluation.

However, the fact is that the transfer of powers to local authorities in Senegal has not been accompanied by a sufficient transfer of resources by the central State. Local authorities are having to face new tasks and responsibilities, and are left feeling they do not have enough resources to cope with their old and new missions.

Recognising this, the State has set up texts to facilitate the search for additional revenue through decentralised cooperation. Thus, local communities without sufficient resources (region and rural communities) can develop external partnerships to ensure their important mission of local development.

To create dynamic partnerships, the contribution of migrants and migrant associations is essential. It is, in fact, generally accepted that the most successful partnerships in local development are initially introduced by migrants who build informal links with local authorities in the country of destination. Thereafter, these partnerships take on a more institutional dimension in the form of twinning, cooperative agreements, etc. between local authorities in countries of origin and countries of destination.

Outside the framework of decentralised cooperation, migrants from Baol, Fouta or Pakao, in Senegal, invest more in the development of their home communities by mobilising their own resources for the construction of classrooms, of health centres or other rural infrastructure. Due to a certain distrust of the local or national political authorities, these initiatives are taking place outside of priorities identified at the local level, and

included in development plans and policies. For example, it is not uncommon to see a multitude of well-built classrooms that remain unoccupied, while the rehabilitation of “pistes de production” (feeder roads) is the main need expressed by local authorities. This is not to say that classrooms are unnecessary, but that the choices for investment made by migrants are often not in correlation with locally identified needs.

Remittances and Money Transfers

According to the Central Bank of West African Economic and Monetary Union (BCEAO, 2013), Senegal is the first recipient of remittances from migrants in the region. The country receives about 47.4% of total remittances. BCEAO (Central Bank of West African States) estimated around 700 billion CFA (10.4% of GDP in 2011) the total amount of transfers to Senegal in 2011. Senegal receives 88.7% of transfers from migrants of Europe and the Americas (BCEAO, 2013).

In addition to contributing to the establishment of a stock of foreign exchange monies for the country, the money from migration contributes to the improvement of living conditions and/or to a significant reduction of poverty at the family level.

In West African Economic and Monetary Union region, the BCEAO study also indicates that funds are primarily assigned to current consumption spending (54.6%), real estate investment (15.8%), other investments (5.5%), as well as spending on health and education (3.4% and 6.4% respectively). Family and religious events mobilize 8.7% of funds received from migrant workers.

In Senegal, approximately 70% of funds received are intended for current consumption. Coverage of religious events is second with 8.2% flow, followed by real estate investment (7.6%) and educational and health support (7.4%). The religious dimension of occasional remittances in this country is due, in part, to the preponderance of this type of transfers received in Diourbel, with strong mobilization of the Mouride com-

munity⁴ established in the diaspora during ceremonies commemoration. In addition, events such as Tabaski (Eid-el-Adha) and Korité (Eid-al-Fitr) are moments generally chosen by migrants to contribute to family expenses. Savings and investment financing are negligible (BCEAO, 2013).

In Senegal, remittances have had a positive impact on poverty. Indeed, in Dakar, there is a 95% spending increase per capita in households receiving money transfers from abroad, versus those which receive none. Outside of the capital, the increase in spending is 63.2% within inland cities and 5.9% in rural areas (Fall).

The amount invested by migrants in their country of origin is certainly growing but a few parts of the funds are dedicated to finance sustainable development. Some food for thought in order to understand the attitude of migrants:

- The low income of migrants is closely linked to their low level of qualifications;
- Mistrust displayed vis-à-vis bank lending, which leads to migrants relying solely on their own income, in order to build a house, even though the possibility of benefitting from a bank loan is available, and many offers exist emanating from financial institutions of the host country;
- The negative perception concerning the accumulation of wealth and/or private property in some parts of Senegal. In the north of Senegal (Senegalese valley) there are examples of sums allocated by migrants to community achievements but not to private investment and/or to create jobs (Fall).

In this regard, one of the main objectives of the Joint Migration and Development Initiative is to foster a better

⁴ The Mouride brotherhood is a large Islamic Sufi order most prominent in Senegal, with headquarters in the holy city of Touba (Diourbel region). The followers are called Mourides, a term used generally in Sufism to designate a disciple of a spiritual guide. The Mouride brotherhood was founded in 1883 in Senegal by Amadou Bamba. The Mouride make up around 1/6 of the total population in Senegal. Their influence over everyday life can be seen throughout Senegal.

articulation of the needs expressed by local authorities and the investments made by migrants. We wish to give the example in two regions of Senegal facing singular needs: Sedhiou and Diourbel.

Sedhiou: an intervention in a crisis context

The region of Sedhiou is located in Casamance, with a population of approximately 456,000 people, an overwhelming part of which are aged under 15 years (about 42% of its population according to ANDS (2010)). The region has many resources. Subsistence farming, inland fisheries, forestry, animal husbandry and arboriculture feature prominently in the regional economy. However, the development potential of the region is compromised by the instability caused by the Casamance conflict⁵.

Human mobility is a constant in the history of the region although insecurity in the area contributed greatly to increasing it. Sedhiou welcomes nationals of neighbouring countries and regions while migration of the local population is both to Europe and other countries in Africa. In the countries of destination, Senegalese nationals from Sedhiou often organise themselves into associations⁶, with a solidarity component. They maintain close ties with their homeland and contribute to the development of Sedhiou through various achievements (through the building of schools, health centres, etc.).

In addition, nationals regularly transfer money to their families and initiate economic projects in the region

⁵ The conflict in Casamance is an important episode in the history of Senegal's independence. At the beginning of the 80's and until 2005, after the ceasefire, it brought into opposition the independent rebel forces of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), led by Abbé Diamacoume Senghor, and Senegal's armed forces. The conflict caused the death of several hundred people and there are many victims from antipersonnel mines, even up to this day. Occasional clashes still occur, between the army and the rebels, but also with rival groups.

⁶ The most important are: Association des ressortissants d'Inor, Association des ressortissants de Tanaff, Association des ressortissants de Karantaba (France), Association des ressortissants et sympathisants de la Casamance en Amérique (United States).

(small businesses, Agricultural Development Bank of cereals). Although Sedhiou is considered to be one of the most affected regions by migration in Senegal, the magnitude and impact is ultimately not sufficiently documented.

Recognising this, local authorities, supported by the Regional Development Agency (ARD), wished, through PAICODEL (Program to support local economic initiatives in the area of co-development in the Sedhiou region), to set up a mechanism to produce reliable knowledge on the links between migration and development in the region. PAICODEL aims mainly to strengthen the Help Office for Migrants (HOM) existing in Sédhiou since 2012 and develops new similar offices in other regions of Casamance (Ziguinchor and Kolda). HOM seeks to guide investment of migrants and their associations by territories, by priority areas and economic sectors. The project also aims to strengthen the role of local communities in Sedhiou in developing and implementing projects for economic development, in collaboration with migrant associations.

Diourbel: creating new dynamics for local development

Diourbel is situated in an agricultural region. This region ('le bassin arachidier', or 'peanut basin') covers the West and Centre of Senegal and corresponds to the administrative regions of Louga, Thiès, Diourbel, Fatick and Kaolack. It covers a third of the surface of Senegal and is host to approximately half of the population. The main crop is peanuts, which guarantees a good part of farmers' income, but other crops such as dried beans, watermelon and cassava root contribute to increasing their income. Diourbel is traditionally known to be a region of high emigration. This is easily explained by the economic crisis in the 'peanut basin', with falling prices of the peanut on the world market in the 80s. Migrants from Diourbel contribute a large extent to meet the basic needs of their families through income transfers. Indeed, remittances from small street vendors in Paris or New York, commonly called "Modou Modou", contribute greatly to reduc-

ing household poverty in the region. However, a small proportion of these important investments are directed to truly productive sectors. Most of the migrants having a relatively low level of financial education⁷; migrants use their resources most often to finance current consumption or festive spending, such as weddings and christenings.

In fact, studies indicate that migrants have generally benefitted from little or no formal education at all, although it appears there has been an increase in the level of education of migrants from this region in recent years. Women migrants in the region tend to be younger than men at the time of departure from Senegal (74% of migrants are between 15 and 34 years according to Fall).

Local authorities in Diourbel and the Regional Development Agency (ARD) developed the *Jappando* Project - Linking migrants, Local Authorities, investors and Economic actors for local development. The ARD, in collaboration with the Senegalese Confederation for the promotion of small and medium enterprises and entrepreneurship emigrants (CONFESEN) and the Association of Women Entrepreneurs of Veneto, Italy, set up the "*Jappando*" initiative in order to strengthen support tools for migrants' economic projects" so as to improve their impact on local development in Diourbel. This initiative, as well as the one in Sedhiou, is being supported by the JMIDI.

The main tool set up is the "Help Desks", an office of information which allows migrants to obtain information on investment opportunities in the region and to benefit from targeted support for developing and setting up their project.

The project also includes an important gender approach. Indeed, one of the activities under the project *Jappando* is to select, train and support the twelve best women's businesses in

⁷ Financial education programmes for migrant workers and their families aimed to provide direct assistance on financial services and accesses as well as income planning and management.

targeted areas.

Strategies to foster intervention

Despite many promising experiences implemented by local governments for migration and development, successful interventions are quite often insufficiently institutionalised, which undermines their sustainability. Our experiences from the field have shown that the involvement of local authorities in these issues is best achieved through supporting concrete initiatives from local actors. The JMIDI partners are hopeful that initiatives in Sedhiou and Diourbel will be sustainable, in view of the real motivation and involvement of local authorities from these areas to carry out the project and achieve its goals.

Another limit encountered by local stakeholders involved in M&D initiatives is the access to relevant information which increases their capacity to effectively link migration and development at the local level and to engage in meaningful strategies. In the context of Senegal, the lack of statistics on movement of persons is a definite stumbling block. For this reason, researchers want the Senegalese Government to establish a National Observatory on Migration, for quantitative assessment of the movement of workers.

Furthermore, JMIDI's experience in working with local authorities has shown that the latter have few opportunities to learn from other local stakeholders' accomplishments. Knowledge sharing thus becomes an essential factor for replicating best practices and forging new partnerships.

Besides interesting initiatives such as this one, local authorities' involvement remains for the time being largely underdeveloped and many obstacles exist as evidenced by the findings of the JMIDI, such as a lack of efficient and effective coordination within local authorities' administration and with other stakeholders. The main difficulty also relates to their lack of internal capacities and of clear awareness of migration dynamics and routes, and how it should inform local policies and services. Migration and development are treated in dif-

ferent policy realms, which results in undefined competencies and responsibilities within local administrations. To a large extent, the linkages between migration and development remain a new field of action for local administrations and targeted support is necessary to fully harness the potential that local authorities can bring in this field.

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Theatre workshop

Senegal, 14 May 2012, Photo | Franco-Emilio Risso

FONDAZIONI4AFRICA PROMOTES CO- DEVELOPMENT BY PARTNERING MIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS

FONDAZIONI4AFRICA SENEGAL INITIATIVE, PROMOTED BY FOUR ITALIAN FOUNDATIONS OF BANKING ORIGIN, ASSIGNED A CENTRAL ROLE TO SENEGALESE DIASPORA ASSOCIATIONS, FROM PROJECT INCEPTION TO DELIVERY. AS REAL PARTNERS THEY SHARED PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSIBILITIES, THUS ENSURING EFFECTIVENESS AND LONG-TERM IMPACTS BOTH IN THEIR COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN AND OF DESTINATION.

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Introduction

Through the Fondazioni4Africa (F4A)¹ Senegal Initiative several very diverse patterns of valorisation of the role of the Senegalese diaspora between Senegal and Italy have been experimented with and promoted. This paper presents an overview of

the most important functions carried out during the implementation of the F4A programme as well as some of the lessons learned and the conclusions that were drawn by the promoters of the F4A after five years of project development.

Italian foundations of banking origin (Compagnia di San Paolo, Fondazione Cariparma, Fondazione Cariplo, Fondazione Monte dei Paschi di Siena) in Senegal between 2008 and 2013. The program's key concepts – co-development, real and virtual return of migrants, and the transnational role of migrants – have been translated into a number of actions

¹ For further information about the Fondazioni4Africa Senegal Programme visit www.fondazioni4africa.org.

Fondazioni4Africa at a glance
F4A is an initiative promoted by four



which have helped to both identify and experiment with new roles for diaspora associations² both in the country of origin and the country of destination. The program aimed to improve the quality of life of rural and peri-urban populations in the various areas of Senegal that most migrants present in Italy originate from – particularly Piedmont, Lombardy, Emilia Romagna and Tuscany. The actions undertaken focused on the promotion of specific agricultural productions (e.g. mangos, milk and other dairy products, typical processed foods), microfinance, responsible tourism, and development education. These initiatives were put in place jointly with Italian organisations (i.e. NGOs and a research centre)³, producers' associations, microfinance institutions, and village organisations⁴ that have been active in these sectors in Senegal for a long time.

The *fil rouge* that cut across the entire program was the central role of diaspora associations in Italy and Senegal. It involved eight migrant associations operating in Italy⁵ and Sen-

egal that participated actively in both countries at various levels⁶.

Partnering migrant associations

The F4A initiative was characterised in particular by the decision on the part of the promoters to regard migrant associations as real partners with full responsibility. The foundations' involvement was not limited to providing financial support, but extended to active and constant engagement so as to contribute strategic insights as well. Foundations promoted a large partnership with several diverse organisations, where a direct connection was created with each partner. This broke away from the concept of a lead partner heading a group of associations. In this framework the partnerships that were created brought together different organisations, including diaspora associations, which played a key role and shared the same 'rights' and 'obligations' as other partners (e.g. Italian NGOs). They participated in various phases of the F4A initiative since its inception, from planning and development to monitoring activities.

Undoubtedly, this approach entailed a number of risks, and weaknesses emerged during the implementation of activities. However, it was essential to boost the piloting of co-development processes between Italy and Senegal. Prior to the start of the F4A programme most other similar projects or programs in Italy did not involve Senegalese migrant associations as active partners with full responsibility. They were generally regarded as mere beneficiaries of actions and projects, unlike the *Fondazioni4Africa* which called for their empowerment and an active participation on a par with other partner organisations.

Over time, this approach inspired similar projects and programs that were launched by Italian Foundations and public institutions – like the Country Programs by *Fondazione Cariplo* (2010) and the co-development plan by the City of Milan. In the framework of the *Fondazioni4Africa* initiative the active participation of diaspora organisations, on the same footing as any other partner, proved

all the more effective when the migrant organisations involved were mature, strong and competent.

Supporting direct involvement in the country of origin

In the framework of the F4A the concept of 'co-development' took various forms, as noted above. In the starting phase it provided a definition connected mainly to the possibility for diaspora associations to start or further develop community development actions in their area of origin in collaboration with local partners. In Lompoul, in the Louga Region, a project for the promotion of responsible tourism was set up to be managed by a Senegalese migrants association, called *Trait d'Union*, in collaboration with an association of local producers. In Kebemer, in the same region, a fruits and vegetables processing and conservation facility was created by a group of women who collaborate with the association of migrant women, *Stretta di Mano*, based in Mantova, Italy. Outside Dakar – in Pikine Est, Malika, Fass Mbaou and Yembeul – four groups of women, in collaboration with the association of Senegalese migrants in Turin, created microfacilities for the processing, packaging and sale of cereals and other food products. These actions aimed to showcase the role that diaspora associations can play in triggering development in local communities. They do this by providing economic inputs as well as management and technical skills, and starting projects in which the community's civil society is actively involved with the participation of local authorities.

The actions put in place in the framework of the F4A initiative were successful and the effects on local communities were more positive when the association's idea of 'co-development' to be pursued was particularly clear. The results of the interventions put in place were effective when the collaboration between the diaspora association and the local partners (i.e. civil society organisations and local authorities) involved in project implementation was more transparent. This was true also when the diaspora association possessed solid management skills.

2 The Senegalese diaspora associations involved in the initiative are the following: Associazione dei Senegalesi di Torino, Comunità dei Senegalesi della Provincia di Parma, Associazione Insieme dei Senegalesi di Faenza, Associazione *Trait d'Union* di Torino, Sunugal di Milano, Associazione *Stretta di Mano* di Mantova, Coordinamento delle Associazioni dei Senegalesi della Toscana (CASTO), Associazione dei Senegalesi di Poggibonsi, and the Federazione delle Associazioni Senegalesi della Toscana.

3 The Italian NGO partners of the F4A programme are the following: ACRA, CISV, COOPI, COSPE. The research centre is CeSPI.

4 The main local partners of the F4A programme in Senegal are the following: APAD, ADID, ADENA, AFSDN, FBAJ, FENAGIE PECHE, RAIL, Union Financière Mutualiste (UFM), Union Rurale des Mutuelles d'Épargne et de Crédit du Sénégal (URMECS), MEC DELTA, Comité intervillageois de la Périphérie du Parc National de Djoudj, Gie des ecogardes de la Langue de Barbarie, Asescaw, Adksl, Fesfop, and the Association pour le développement de Sippo

5 All activities involving migrants associations have been continuously analysed by CESPI, an Italian research organisation specialised in migration. The main results of the work developed by CESPI within the F4A programme are contained in the publication: "Movimenti migratori e percorsi di cooperazione – L'esperienza di co-sviluppo di *Fondazioni4Africa*, Carocci Editore, 2012

Strengthening skills

Since the early days, considering the specific high competences needed to effectively develop the actions planned, it appeared clear that the role of diaspora associations would consolidate through training as well as through a strengthening of their institutional and management skills. Thus training programs were designed in Italy – particularly in the Foundation's regions of reference (Piedmont, Lombardy, Emilia Romagna and Tuscany) – to promote capacity building, technical assistance, and management skills targeting the nine diaspora associations involved. The courses were organised by the Italian NGOs involved in the F4A initiative. The training program that accompanied the F4A initiative for its duration (five years) contributed to increasing the management, technical and institutional skills of the participating migrant associations. Specifically, it helped to identify the associations' mission more clearly, to consolidate the management and technical skills of the partners, to create strong strategic partnerships between diaspora associations and NGOs, and to better clarify the role of the associations on Italian soil, where they operate, and in Senegal, their country of origin. It also helped in facilitating mediation and creating a bridge between the two countries.

For the duration of the F4A initiative around 100 Senegalese migrants from the nine partner diaspora associations participated in training and capacity building activities. It should be noted that, while effective in paving the way to long-term benefits, at times these activities generated conflict and discussion within the organisations. In certain cases this resulted in the splitting up of the association or the removal of some members. Furthermore, not all migrants associations involved benefited from training and capacity building activities in the same way and few of them did not managed to complete the training paths. Moreover, the partnerships between NGOs and associations did not always run smoothly and effectively and in some cases, particularly in the early stages, difficulties emerged in terms of relations and different views

of the organisations' respective roles, often fuelled by bias and a misplaced sense of competitiveness.

However, also thanks to intensive training and capacity building activities, the Senegalese diaspora associations are now much stronger, with better skills and competences and a more defined role. They are also able to prioritise the most strategic actions and engage in constructive dialogue with various organisations. Nowadays, diaspora associations are more inclined and better prepared to create partnerships between Senegalese migrants associations in Italy. In this sense it is interesting to note that training and institutional building activities have promoted the establishment of a network that brings together Senegalese migrants associations in Italy.

This is supported by the Coordinating Committee of Senegalese Associations of Tuscany in collaboration with the NGO COSPE in Florence which counts thirteen member associations in Italy to date. This was an independent initiative that is still developing at this point: Senegalese associations in Italy are operating as a National Federation. This is certainly an encouraging development issued from internal reflection, institutional building consolidation and the definition of long-term missions for the associations of the Senegalese diaspora in Italy.

Promoting saving and remittances through rural microfinance

Another peculiar and innovative experience carried out within the F4A concerned the mechanism for the valorisation of migrants' savings and fostering of rural microfinance institutions. The mechanism was based on an in-depth analysis of possible alternatives for the canalisation of remittances of the diaspora, from Italy to Senegal, carried out by CESPI during the first three years of the F4A. The aim was the creation of a 'dedicated environment' (or 'platform') where all the subjects involved (i.e. migrants, Italian and Senegalese banks, money transfer operators, Senegalese microfinance institutions and families of Senegalese migrants) could benefit from the very considerable value of migrants' savings and remittances

that are often undervalued both in the country of destination and in the community of origin. At present, this different approach to migrants' remittances is being tested and the construction of the platform has proven very complex due to the number of different types of stakeholders involved. Nevertheless it appears to be an effective tool for a more adequate use of the significant resources that are transferred from Italy to Senegal every year, particularly in terms of creating better opportunities for migrants, their families and microfinance institutions operating in the rural areas of Senegal. Similar mechanisms are now in place between Italy and Ecuador, and between Italy and Peru, based on the same framework, which also rests on a specific cooperation agreement signed in 2012 between ABI (Italian Banks Association) and ACRI (Italian Association of Foundations of Banking Origin).

Bridging between Italy and Senegal

In the five years since the creation of the F4A initiative, the concept of co-development has witnessed a number of different applications that translated into various actions for the promotion of the role of migrants. Two of these deserve special mention. One experience refers to the role of diaspora groups in the promotion of long-term partnerships between the country of origin and the country of destination.

In the framework of the F4A, Senegalese diaspora associations and migrants have become the protagonists of long-term partnerships between Senegal and Italy. Thanks to their peculiar transnational character and their familiarity with both contexts and a feeling of belonging to both countries, migrants associations have proved invaluable bridges for cooperation between Italy and Senegal for the establishment and the promotion of stable and durable relations between communities in the two countries. Since 2010 Senegalese migrants associations have organised missions to Italy for Senegalese local authorities and civil society organisations. During these missions, meetings with Italian local authorities, universities, and civil society organi-

sations have taken place, partnership agreements between Senegalese and Italian authorities have been signed or renewed, and seminars on migration and other issues concerning the project (e.g. agriculture promotion, microfinance) have been organised with an active role of Senegalese migrants associations involved across the board. In 2011 around ten Senegalese partners and local authorities travelled to Italy to participate in special events (e.g. conferences, film festivals, concerts, cultural events, etc.) organised by Senegalese diaspora associations in several Italian cities (i.e. Milan, Treviglio, Faenza, Parma, Mantova, Siena, Poggibonsi, Florence, Turin, Cirié, Grugliasco, and Moncalieri) under the common flag of *Carovana4Africa*.

Carovana4Africa provided considerable visibility to Senegalese migrants associations allowing for the presentation of diaspora associations and their activities to a broader Italian audience. *Carovana4Africa* events not only promoted the recognition of Senegalese diaspora associations in the Italian host territories, but also allowed visiting local authorities and partner organisations from Senegal to gain a better understanding of the active role that migrants can play both in Italy and in their community of origin. Also thanks to *Carovana4Africa*, diaspora associations are considered as very important stakeholders and reliable key players in decentralised cooperation mechanisms.

Today, despite the decrease of public and private resources for international cooperation programs, several diaspora associations involved in the F4A promote and participate in decentralised cooperation projects supported by Italian authorities or the European Commission in which a number of Italian and Senegalese public and private partners are involved. Again, the stronger the diaspora association, the more active and more effective its role in these projects. Additionally, in some cases, as an additional result, these processes have helped to promote a more active role of migrants in the political life of their areas of origin. For example, in 2012 after a visit to Italy organised by the migrants as-

sociation *Stretta di Mano* in Mantova, in the context of *Carovana4Africa*, the Mayor of Kebemer decided to open the doors of the municipal council to three new members who represent migrants from the town of Kebemer who are now living in Italy.

Engaging in awareness raising and development education activities

Another experience that provided yet another interpretation of the F4A's concept of 'co-development' concerns the role of migrants in development education and awareness-raising actions carried out in the framework of the F4A. Between 2009 and 2011 a number of awareness-raising and development education activities were organised for secondary schools students (aged fourteen to 18) in Italy and Senegal. About 2000 students participated in development education activities organised in around 30 schools both in Italy and Senegal.

Development education actions always entailed the active participation of migrants acting as animators and co-educators in school activities. About 60 migrants were involved in the design of course curricula, direct training courses targeting students, monitoring and evaluation activities, and the promotion of stable partnerships between Italian and Senegalese schools. They also participated in multi-country pedagogical team activities to ensure uniformity between Italian and Senegalese education activities. After a first phase of specific training, migrants became the true protagonists of these activities both in Italy and Senegal. Their ability to understand both cultures, to recognise and deal with prejudice from both sides, and to narrate their own migration stories to students highlighted the distinctive role that migrants can play in awareness raising and education activities.

Messages, stories and reflections about migration and interdependence between different territories of the world can be better disseminated and made more effective through the unique first-person testimonies that only migrants can contribute. The active role of migrants in development education and awareness-raising ac-

tivities proved particularly effective also because the actions were organised in both countries and students were engaged on the same issues using similar methods. Methodologies and pedagogical tools designed in the first three years of the F4A have been consolidated and transferred on a wider European scale through 'Parlez Vous Global?' This is a project implemented by a number of Italian NGOs and one migrant association (*Stretta di Mano*) that participate at the F4A, in cooperation with other European organisations. Project activities targeted teachers and students in seven European and African countries (i.e. Italy, France, Austria, Romania, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Benin) with a focus on migration and the active involvement of migrants in awareness raising and education issues.

Conclusions

1. After five years of intense activities to promote and experiment with different co-development approaches between Senegal and Italy, a more accurate sense of the meaning of 'co-development' has developed. The numerous 'lessons learned' have been taken into account by Italian foundations in the design and launch, in early 2014, of a new joint initiative in Burkina Faso where the promotion of the role of diaspora associations between the two countries represents once again a key element of a wider programme. It would appear useful to share the following conclusions with experts and organisations involved in 'migration and development' processes and activities. Diaspora associations are authentic and invaluable players in the development picture and they should be recognised as such without prejudice or bias by the other players involved.

2. Migrant associations can effectively ensure long-term impacts through actions and programs in their country and community of origin. Compared to other players (e.g. international NGOs, bilateral or multilateral cooperation organisations) migrants can guarantee greater continuity for the interventions developed in their community of origin by virtue of their personal history and trajectories. International NGOs and cooperation

programs may move from one area to another (e.g. due to emergency reasons or to mission changes over time), but diaspora migrants keep their focus on the country of origin, where their roots and family are.

3. The role of diaspora associations in development should not be manipulated or overestimated. Migrants associations can be effective players in facilitating change both in the community of origin and in the country of destination, together with other subjects and organisations.

4. 'From beneficiaries to co-promoters' should be the paradigmatic change always applied to co-development programs. Migrants should be guaranteed real and active participation in the design, planning, implementation and evaluation of co-development programs in a system that ensures equal conditions and powers to all those involved while recognising mutual limitations and potential.

5. The impact of the participation of diaspora groups in development mechanisms in the country of origin and in the territory of destination can be real and effective only if migrants associations are solid and technically qualified. In this sense it is strongly recommended to envisage long-term training and capacity-building actions for migrants organisations in co-development programs.

6. The contribution of diaspora associations in the area of origin are truly effective only if their actions are in line with local development plans for those territories. It is important that migrants associations shift from a logic of intervention designed to respond to emergency or one-off needs towards wider local development strategies.

7. When supporting co-development mechanisms and models, promoters should always consider transnationality as the core approach of the whole intervention. Co-development means ensuring an active role for diaspora associations in direct interventions carried out in the country of origin with the aim of contributing to local development mechanisms and

processes. At the same time co-development also requires a genuine empowerment of diaspora associations in actions that are implemented in the country of destination, for example with the aim of promoting migrants' citizenship rights and better living conditions.



Dakar from Ngor

Ngor, Dakar, Senegal, 9 October 2010, Photo | Jeff Attaway



SWITCHING PERSPECTIVES: SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN SENEGAL

SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION, JUST AS COMMON AS SOUTH-NORTH MIGRATION, REPRESENTS A TRADITIONAL LIVELIHOOD STRATEGY FOR MILLIONS OF PEOPLE. BEYOND LINKED HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION'S GENERAL IMPACT ON LOCAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN SENEGAL SEEMS TO BE QUITE POSITIVE. THIS IS CONFIRMED BY THE CASE OF GUINEAN MANJACKS AND GHANAIAN FISHERMEN, WHO RESETTLED IN THE CASAMANCE REGION.

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Introduction

Traditionally, mobility between developing countries has received considerably less attention than South-North migration. Yet, South-South

flows not only represent a traditional livelihood strategy for millions of people in the global South, they are also just as common as South-North

migration, with latest figures showing 82.3 million international migrants from the South living in the South and slightly fewer (81.9 million) from the






Figure 2: Immigration to Senegal from global South and North. Source: Data from UN DESA (2013)

of the region's inhabitants to leave their homes.

Geographical and cultural proximity as well as linguistic, ethnic, family and social ties are important factors influencing Senegalese migrants to choose to migrate to another country in West Africa (ACP Observatory 2013). In addition, the lower costs and the 1979 ECOWAS Protocol on the free movement of persons, the right of establishment and residence have spurred such intraregional migration (Gagnon et al. 2010). Social networks of migrants within the region also play an important role in this sense, as newly arrived migrants tend to be hired by their co-nationals in certain economic sectors, for example Senegalese migrants in the fishing sector in Gambia (Awumbila et al. 2013). Other factors influencing the choice to migrate with the region are increased economic growth and opportunities in some countries, such as The Gambia, as well as increasingly restrictive migration policies in the North (Gagnon et al. 2010). Finally, the ease of return and circulation migration within the region may encourage Senegalese emigrants to migrate to a neighboring country, rather than to the North (ACP Observatory 2013).

on both human and economic development are still visible. It is estimated that the conflict has caused the death of at least 1,200 civilians and soldiers, 600 victims of mines, 60,000 internally displaced persons, 13,000 refugees to The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, 231 abandoned villages and 4,000 students unable to attend school (PR-Ocas 2005 and Manga 2012 in Dièye Gueye 2014).

According to UN DESA (2013), there were 209,396 immigrants in Senegal in 2013. Of these, 89 per cent were from other countries in the South (see Figure 2). Top countries of origin in the South include Mauritania (40,955), Guinea (39,594), Mali (26,193), Guinea Bissau (22,670), and Sierra Leone (11,453), highlighting again the high level of intraregional migration (UN DESA 2013). Immigrants are reported to be working in agriculture, fishing, production and processing, and a variety of informal sectors including artisanal gold mining (IOM 2009 and Dièye Gueye 2014). In some cases, immigrants or internal migrants from rural areas are replacing departing emigrants in the labour market (Awumbila et al., 2013). The commercial agriculture sector, in particular draws its labour supply for seasonal migration from the region.

South-South migration in Senegal: a matter of rights

Next to the search for economic opportunities, displacement due to environmental reasons and conflict in neighboring countries as well as human trafficking bring people to Senegal. Although internal trafficking is more prevalent, boys from The Gambia, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea have been trafficked into forced begging and forced labor in artisanal gold mines and agriculture in Senegal (US State Department 2013). Senegalese women and girls are trafficked into domestic servitude and prostitution, most recently in the southeast gold-mining region of Kedougou (Daffé 2012). Overall, children are the most

affected by trafficking, with NGOs estimating that over 50,000 children in Senegal are forced to beg, most commonly as *talibes*, students of Koran schools, run by teachers known as *marabouts* (US State Department 2013). Girls from Mali and Niger have also been reported begging in Dakar (Coulibaly 2012).

Although the migration of children entails many risks, NGOs and international organizations working to protect children have noted that efforts to prevent their migration were largely ineffective, due to the historical, cultural and religious as well as economic and social contexts of child mobility. In addition, some studies have shown that this mobility not only represents an important survival strategy in West Africa, but also brings opportunities and positive impacts for children in terms of education and health if risks are prevented and safe migration is ensured (Projet «Mobilités» 2011). In fact, fostering of children, who often move to other communities or countries to live with relatives or an extended network, is a common practice in many African countries. At least in some circumstances, this tradition can be beneficial for children, leading to improved living standards and access to better services or education opportunities (Beegle, K. et al. 2009). However, it can also be related to exploitative conditions as described above.

Similar to those migrating to the North, emigrants in West Africa can face discrimination abroad (Gagnon

Hailing from the region of Cacheu in Guinea-Bissau, the Manjack ethnic group has a long migratory tradition within West Africa. Emigration to Senegal started at the end of 19th century; the country was offering work opportunities and representing an escape from the brutality of Portuguese colonization. This migratory trend further increased in the 1960s and continues today. Similarly, Ghanaian fishermen started settling in Dakar and more recently in the western islands of Ziguinchor (Casamance) to carry out fishing and fish processing activities since the 1950s. Currently, more than 2,000 Ghanaian fishermen are estimated to live in the areas of Cap-Skirring, Elinkine, Diogu , Kafountine, and Saloulou (Di ye Gueye 2014).

The study reveals that South-South migration towards the Casamance region has had positive impacts on human development in Senegal thanks to the intangible transfers from these two migrant communities to the local population. Intangible transfers can have a multiplier effect which is often missing in the case of financial transfers. Social remittances transmitted back to their community of origin by Senegalese migrants abroad and returnees also emerge as a key feature for development.

Based on the findings of the study, it can be argued that intangible and social transfers originating from migration (both towards and from Casamance) do have a positive impact on human development and should therefore be taken into consideration in development plans. In particular, intangible and social transfers have positive effects in the following fields:

Impact on economic activities

In the agricultural sector, Manjack migrants have introduced innovative techniques for cashew nut processing in Senegal. Despite the fact that the potential of this sector is not fully exploited, the Manjack are recognized as playing a key role in the production and retail of this product both in Senegal and in Guinea-Bissau.

In the fishery sector, the transfer of knowledge from Ghanaian and Guin-

ean migrants has led to a visible development of the fishery industry with positive repercussions for the local economy in Casamance. In fact, while the local population had no experience with offshore fishery, Ghanaian fishermen have introduced not only new fishing techniques but also their know-how on fish drying, an expertise which guarantees an increased sanitary standard and eventually facilitates the export of this product. Furthermore, the increased demand for this product has had a positive impact also on the transport sector, as convoys of trucks of dried fish regularly head off from the coast of Casamance to Ghana and Ivory Coast. The potential of fishermen migrants has been recognised by Senegalese local authorities in Kafountine through the establishment of a partnership between the Ghanaian community and the inhabitants of the village. This collaboration aimed at promoting the insertion of young unemployed Senegalese in the fishery sector demonstrates how inclusion is a key element for maximizing the positive impact of migration and that efforts by local government or community actors can help promote such positive contributions.

Lastly, positive impacts of social remittances have been observed also in the cattle breeding sector. In Nyassia, for instance, returned migrants have transmitted their knowledge to local pork farmers who now supply pork meat in Guinea Bissau, where the demand is high especially during festivities.

Impacts on education and culture

In the region of Kolda, migrants are active members of community life and participate in local radio broadcasting. In particular, they take part in sessions aimed at stressing the importance of schooling, especially for girls, and the registration of new births in the State records. As a result, the local population of Kolda considers migrants veritable actors of local development. The high school graduation rate has increased from less than 30 per cent to more than 60 per cent, in part thanks to the involvement of migrants, who promoted, *inter alia*, the building of separate toilets for girls,

allowing them to attend school also during menstruation.

In Elinkine, the Ghanaian community is also well integrated in the village and the enrollment in the Ghanaian primary school is open to Senegalese children, who can therefore benefit from a bilingual education in English and French at an early age. In this case, the integration of Ghanaian migrants has thus led to positive effects for both the migrants and the community of destination.

Intangible transfers can have a positive impact also on art and cultural traditions. A case in point is the Ab n  Festival, initiated by migrants and the local rural community, which promotes the artistic scene of the area. In terms of traditions, migrants abroad are initiating a change in cultural values with regards to funerary rituals. Often financing these ceremonies through remittances, migrants abroad are advocating for cost reduction so as to enable increased investment in more productive causes.

Impacts on health and the environment

Awareness-raising sessions on different topics related to health are held by immigrants on a regular basis in different locations in Casamance, ranging from the use of impregnated mosquito nets to the importance of hand-washing with soap after defecation.

Finally, the impact of intangible transfers on the environment is less evident and not necessarily positive. In fact, deforestation is being experienced in Casamance because firewood is needed for the process of smoking fish. Yet positive impacts related to this process can also be observed. In the region of Ziguinchor, for instance, techniques introduced by Ghanaian fishermen have led to an enhanced respect for the environment in the fishing industry thanks to the recycling of scales and other fish guts into animal feed.

Conclusion

South-South migration can represent many positive, but currently largely unexplored, impacts for migrants, their families and communities. More research and informed policy efforts



are necessary in the global South, especially in regions like West Africa, where South-South flows account for the majority of mobility.

Given that migrants often face similar challenges in both the global North and South, policy initiatives in both developing and developed countries must place emphasis on ensuring migrants' rights and promoting their social inclusion. Only then, can migration have sustained positive impacts for both migrants and their communities of origin and destination. As shown in several examples above, when local and national governments engage with migrants as actors of development and communities include them and promote their contributions to social life, migrants can bring concrete improvements to economic, educational, cultural, health and environmental areas. On the other hand, without rights protection and social inclusion, migrants will continue to experience exploitation, discrimination and human rights abuses, as is currently the case for many Senegalese emigrants abroad and immigrants living in the country.

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pp. 88-89

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TRAINING COURSE FOR FIELD OFFICERS WORKING ON HUMAN RIGHTS	3 - 14 July 2014	19 May 2014	info@entriforccm.eu www.entriforccm.eu
PHD IN POLITICS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABILITY	from October 2014	open	www.sssup.it/phdapplicationonline www.sssup.it
THE MASTER OF ARTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT	from January 2015	2 July 2014, non EU 17 September 2014, EU	humanrights@sssup.it www.humanrights.sssup.it

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the ITPCM venue in Pisa, archive photo

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